

The Virtues

Habit, mean, grace, and human flourishing

An Aristotelian, Augustinian, and Thomistic reference

Contents

1	The Object	1
2	The Philosophical Grammar of Virtue	1
2.1	Power, act, disposition, and habit	1
2.2	A robust definition	1
2.3	Natural aptitude, natural virtue, and perfected habit	1
2.4	The rational mean	2
2.5	Moral and intellectual virtue	2
2.6	Acquired, infused, and theological virtue	2
2.7	Connection and hierarchy	3
3	The Theological Virtues	3
3.1	Faith (<i>fides</i>)	3
3.2	Hope (<i>spes</i>)	4
3.3	Charity (<i>caritas</i>)	4
3.4	Theological synthesis	5
4	The Four Cardinal Virtues	5
4.1	Why there are four	5
4.2	Integral, subjective, and potential parts	5
4.3	Specific habits, general conditions, and modes	6
4.4	The cardinal virtues as ordered love	7
5	Prudence: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts	7
5.1	The principal cardinal and personal prudence	7
5.1.1	Prudence	7
5.2	Integral parts of complete prudential action	8
5.3	Subjective species: prudence for self and communities	8
5.3.1	Regnative prudence	8
5.3.2	Political prudence	9
5.3.3	Domestic or economic prudence	9
5.3.4	Military prudence	9
5.4	Potential parts: counsel and judgment	10
5.4.1	Euboulia (good counsel)	10
5.4.2	Synesis (sound judgment)	10
5.4.3	Gnome (higher judgment)	10
5.5	Prudence, law, and uncertainty	11
6	Justice: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts	11
6.1	The principal virtue and its objective mean	11
6.1.1	Justice	11
6.2	General or legal justice	12
6.2.1	Legal or general justice	12
6.3	Equity and severity in relation to legal justice	12
6.3.1	Equity (<i>epieikeia</i>)	12
6.3.2	Severity	13
6.4	Particular justice	13
6.4.1	Distributive justice	13
6.4.2	Commutative justice	14
6.4.3	Penance (as a virtue)	14
6.5	Potential parts: dues without full equality	15
6.5.1	Religion (<i>religio</i>)	15
6.5.2	Piety (<i>pietas</i>)	15
6.5.3	Observance (<i>observantia</i>)	16
6.5.4	Dulia	16

6.5.5	Obedience	17
6.5.6	Gratitude	17
6.5.7	Vindication (proportionate vengeance)	17
6.5.8	Truthfulness	18
6.5.9	Affability (social friendship)	18
6.5.10	Liberality	18
6.6	Justice corrected by neither sentiment nor mechanism	19
7	Fortitude: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts	19
7.1	The principal virtue: endurance and attack	19
7.1.1	Fortitude (courage)	19
7.2	Quasi-integral requirements in fortitude's proper matter	20
7.3	Annexed virtues for undertaking difficult goods	20
7.3.1	Magnanimity	20
7.3.2	Magnificence	20
7.4	Annexed virtues for enduring difficulty	21
7.4.1	Patience	21
7.4.2	Longanimity	21
7.4.3	Perseverance	21
7.4.4	Constancy	22
7.5	Acts and semblances that are not additional virtues	22
8	Temperance: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts	22
8.1	The principal virtue and the pleasures of touch	23
8.1.1	Temperance	23
8.2	Integral parts: shamefacedness and moral beauty	23
8.3	Subjective species: food, drink, and sexual appetite	23
8.3.1	Abstinence	23
8.3.2	Sobriety	24
8.3.3	Chastity	24
8.3.4	Virginity	24
8.4	Potential parts: continence, anger, and lesser matters	25
8.4.1	Clemency	25
8.4.2	Meekness	25
8.5	Modesty and its specified fields	25
8.5.1	Modesty	26
8.5.2	Humility	26
8.5.3	Studiosness	26
8.5.4	Eutrapelia (ready wit in play)	27
8.6	Temperance as liberation	27
9	Other Moral Virtues with Secure Provenance	27
9.1	Mercy (<i>misericordia</i>)	28
9.2	Unnamed mean concerning ordinary honor	28
10	The Remaining Intellectual Virtues	28
10.1	Understanding of principles (<i>nous/intellectus</i>)	29
10.2	Science (<i>episteme/scientia</i>)	29
10.3	Wisdom (<i>sophia/sapientia</i>)	29
10.4	Art (<i>techne/ars</i>)	30
11	Qualified and Cognate States	30
11.1	Natural or inchoate virtue	30
11.2	Continence	31
11.3	Shame (<i>aidos/verecundia</i>)	31
11.4	Complete friendship	31
11.5	Righteous indignation (<i>nemesis</i>)	32
11.6	Heroic or divine virtue	32

11.7 Nobility-and-goodness (<i>kalokagathia</i>)	32
11.8 Why qualification matters	32
12 Integration, Category Boundaries, and Formation	33
12.1 Virtue, vice, sin, and passion	33
12.2 Gifts, fruits, beatitudes, and grace	33
12.3 Other exclusions that prevent double counting	34
12.4 Acquiring and exercising virtue	34
12.5 A disciplined examination of action	35
12.6 The unity of a virtuous life	35
A Scope, Corpus, and Taxonomy	35
A.1 What this reference means by “comprehensive”	35
A.2 Taxonomic levels and the rule against flattening	36
A.3 Controlling Thomistic distinctions	36
A.4 The sorting algorithm	36
A.5 How to read defect, excess, contrary, and counterfeit	37
A.6 Three voices, one controlled synthesis	37
A.7 Limits on use	38
A.8 Citation, rights, and verification limits	38
B Taxonomic Defect–Virtue–Excess Lexicon	39
B.1 Qualified and cognate states outside the strict census	42
B.2 Count, hierarchy, and sorting check	42
C References	43
C.1 Aristotle	43
C.2 Augustine	43
C.3 Thomas Aquinas	44
C.4 Scripture and present Catholic synopsis	44

1 The Object

Virtue is a stable perfection of a human power for good action. Moral virtue gives appetite a rational form; intellectual virtue perfects reason for truth; theological virtue is infused by God and has God as origin, motive, and object. These orders cooperate, but they are not interchangeable. Consequently, the language of defect and excess must follow the kind of virtue being studied rather than force every excellence into one symmetrical diagram.

2 The Philosophical Grammar of Virtue

2.1 Power, act, disposition, and habit

A **power** is a capacity for a kind of act: intellect for knowing, will for rational appetite, and the sensitive appetites for passions responsive to perceived good and evil. An **act** actualizes a power here and now. A **disposition** orders a subject well or badly and may be unstable. A **habit** (Greek *hexis*, Latin *habitus*) is a durable qualitative determination by which a power is readily disposed to act in a certain way (Aristotle, *Categories* 8; ST I-II, qq. 49–54).

Habit here does not mean blind repetition. It is an interior principle of ready action. Repeated proportionate acts ordinarily cause and strengthen acquired habits, while the mature habit in turn makes acts prompt, coherent, and characteristically one's own. No sequence of acts causes an infused habit: God alone infuses it and gives its increase. Acts proceeding from infused virtue under grace are genuinely free and dispose the person for God-given increase; in powers susceptible of habituation, the same acts can also form acquired facility (ST I-II, q. 51, aa. 2, 4; q. 52, a. 3).

2.2 A robust definition

Aristotle defines character virtue as a choice-governing disposition in a mean relative to us, determined by reason as the practically wise person would determine it (*Nicomachean Ethics* II.6, 1106b36–1107a8). Aquinas receives two Augustinian controls—virtue is that by which one lives rightly, and no one makes bad use of virtue—and synthesizes the metaphysical point: virtue is a good operative habit that perfects a power so that both the possessor and the characteristic work are good (ST I-II, q. 55, aa. 1–4).

Accordingly:

Virtue is a stable operative perfection of a rational creature's power, specifying it toward a fitting good so that the person knows, chooses, desires, or effects that good readily and well.

Every term matters. *Stable* distinguishes virtue from impulse. *Operative* distinguishes it from health or beauty considered merely as states. *Perfection* means fulfillment of a power's good, not flawlessness of biography. *Fitting good* excludes efficient pursuit of an evil end. *Readily and well* includes object, end, circumstances, choice, and firmness, not external performance alone.

2.3 Natural aptitude, natural virtue, and perfected habit

Nature supplies beginnings, not a finished moral character. Human beings possess first principles of knowledge and action, a natural appetite for rational good, and individual temperamental aptitudes that can make some acts easier. Aquinas therefore calls virtue natural by *aptitude and inchoation*, not by perfection (ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1). An aptitude for courage is not yet fortitude, and a ready sympathy is not yet mercy: circumstance, right reason, choice, and stable formation still have to specify the act.

Aristotle likewise distinguishes “natural virtue” from virtue in the strict sense. A native tendency can resemble justice, temperance, or courage, yet without prudence it can miss the concrete good and even do harm; when practical wisdom is present, the corresponding excellence is virtue in the full sense (*Nicomachean Ethics* VI.13, 1144b1–17). The expression therefore names an inchoate likeness or aptitude in this reference, not another row beside the perfected habit. It also explains why temperament is neither moral destiny nor a sufficient basis for praising or condemning a person.

2.4 The rational mean

The mean is neither mediocrity nor compromise. For passions and actions that vary by degree and circumstance, virtue responds to the right object, toward the right person, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right manner. That measure is “relative to us” because a fitting quantity or danger varies with role, strength, need, and circumstance; it is not subjective preference because right reason and the real good judge it (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.6–9; ST I–II, q. 64, aa. 1–2).

Virtue is a mean in its structure but an extreme in excellence. Fortitude may require facing death; generosity may require giving everything one may rightly give; truthfulness may require costly confession. Conversely, some acts are wrongful by their object and do not acquire goodness from a moderate quantity. Aristotle’s own examples in *Nicomachean Ethics* II.6 include adultery, theft, and murder. One does not seek a temperate degree of betrayal or a prudent amount of fraud.

The mean differs by type:

Order	Measure	What can vary	Principal caution
Moral virtue	Right reason in passion and action	Object, person, time, end, manner, intensity	Not arithmetic averaging
Justice	Equality or proportion in what is due	Shares, exchanges, burdens, restitution	The victim’s deficient share is not a vice
Intellectual virtue	Truth	Demonstration, judgment, production, practical command	Not a passion flanked by quantitative vices
Theological virtue	Divine truth and goodness	The subject’s participation and mode of act	No intrinsic excess toward God

Even intellectual virtue has a mean in the analogical sense of conformity to its measure, which is truth. A false affirmation exceeds by asserting what is not; a false denial falls short by denying what is. These are ways an act of judgment misses truth, not a universal pair of stable vice habits flanking understanding, science, wisdom, or art (ST I–II, q. 64, a. 3). The appendix therefore records the truth-measure without inventing four passion-like vice pairs.

2.5 Moral and intellectual virtue

Intellectual virtues perfect reason in knowing truth or directing work. Moral virtues perfect appetite to follow reason. This does not make moral virtue irrational: choice joins desire and reason, and a fully virtuous person not only does the right external deed but desires and chooses it under the right description. Prudence is the hinge. It cannot supply a good ultimate moral end to a corrupt appetite; moral virtue stabilizes the right end, while prudence finds, judges, and commands the concrete means (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.12–13; ST I–II, q. 58, aa. 4–5).

Mere cleverness efficiently finds means to whatever goal is supplied. It becomes useful to prudence when the end is good and knavery when the end is corrupt. Likewise, technical mastery can produce a fine artifact while its maker acts unjustly. Art perfects making; prudence perfects acting as a human person.

2.6 Acquired, infused, and theological virtue

Acquired moral virtues arise through human acts under reason and order a person to a good proportionate to human nature. Infused moral virtues are caused by God, take divine law as their rule, and order acts to supernatural beatitude. They can concern materially similar actions while differing formally by rule and end: acquired temperance measures appetite for rational human good; infused temperance measures it as a disciple journeying toward communion with God (ST I–II, q. 63, aa. 2–4).

The theological virtues are not merely infused versions of cardinal virtues. Faith perfects intellect for revealed divine truth; hope perfects will toward supernatural beatitude as attainable by divine help; charity unites the will to God in friendship. Their object exceeds what unaided human power can proportionately attain (ST I–II, q. 62).

Infusion does not make practice irrelevant. Grace heals and elevates free agency, and acts elicited from infused virtue exercise that virtue and dispose the person for the increase God gives; they do not manufacture supernatural habit by repetition. Those acts can at the same time build an acquired readiness in the powers they repeatedly engage. Acquired ease and infused orientation therefore need not arrive together. A converted person can possess infused charity while still laboring against deeply acquired habits, even as grace-enabled practice gradually brings the sensible life into greater harmony.

2.7 Connection and hierarchy

Perfect moral virtue requires prudence, because good appetite must be translated into a concrete right act; perfect prudence requires the moral virtues, because reasoning about means cannot make a corrupt ultimate intention good. In the infused order charity gives the virtues their living orientation to the supernatural end. Faith and hope can remain in an unformed state without charity, but they then lack the perfection by which the whole life is ordered to God in love (ST I-II, q. 65; II-II, q. 4, a. 3; q. 23, aa. 7–8).

This connection does not erase uneven development. A virtue may be more ready in one matter, a person may possess knowledge without prompt appetite, and grave sin can destroy charity while leaving acquired skills and some unformed supernatural habits. The doctrine of connection identifies formal dependence among perfect virtues; it is not a claim that every virtuous person displays identical temperament, expertise, or ease.

3 The Theological Virtues

The theological virtues are caused by God, immediately order the person to God, and take divine truth and goodness as their rule. They therefore exceed the proportion of acquired virtue. Faith gives the supernatural end to be known, hope tends toward it under divine assistance, and charity unites the will to God as friend. Their order of generation is faith, hope, charity; their order of perfection culminates in charity, which gives the whole infused life its form (ST I-II, q. 62; II-II, qq. 1–46; CCC 1812–1829).

Why there is no “too much” theological virtue

God cannot be believed, hoped in, or loved beyond the measure due to God. A human act associated with religion can nevertheless be disordered: credulity can mistake a private claim for revelation, presumption can expect salvation without repentance, and zeal can violate justice. Such failures corrupt judgment, hope’s manner, or a commanded moral act; they are not an intrinsic excess of faith or charity in their divine object.

3.1 Faith (*fides*)

Class and provenance: Principal theological virtue; ST I-II, q. 62; II-II, qq. 1–16; Augustine, *Enchiridion* 7–8; CCC 1814–1816.

Formal object: The First Truth speaking: materially, God and all that God reveals; formally, divine truth as the motive of assent.

Characteristic act: To assent by grace to revealed truth because of the authority of God who reveals, and thereby to begin a knowing adherence to God.

Defect-side opposition: **Unbelief** is the named contrary (K); heresy and apostasy are specifically ordered departures from received faith, not additional mean flanks.

Excess-side opposition: No intrinsic excess exists in the divine object (NA). **Credulity** is a counterfeit failure of evidence, discernment, or prudence, not superabundant theological faith.

Boundary: Faith is neither natural opinion nor demonstrative science. Unformed faith can truly assent without charity; living faith works through charity. The virtue is distinct from the gifts of understanding and knowledge and from any private revelation.

Faith perfects intellect, but its act is commanded by a will moved by grace. Its obscurity is not irrationality: the motive of assent is God’s truthfulness, while the realities believed surpass direct vision. Doubt as temptation or

intellectual difficulty is not identical with the voluntary repudiation that constitutes unbelief. Conversely, multiplying unverified religious assertions does not strengthen faith, because faith is specified by what God reveals rather than by the intensity of a believer's confidence.

3.2 Hope (*spes*)

Class and provenance: Principal theological virtue; ST I–II, q. 62; II–II, qq. 17–22; Augustine, *Enchiridion* 8 and 114; CCC 1817–1821.

Formal object: God possessed in eternal beatitude as a future, arduous, yet possible good, attainable through divine assistance.

Characteristic act: To tend with confident reliance toward eternal life and the graced means leading to it.

Defect-side opposition: **Despair** is a named contrary that judges or chooses the supernatural end as unattainable, especially by mistrusting divine mercy or refusing conversion (K).

Excess-side opposition: **Salvific presumption** is the opposed vice that expects the end through one's own power or without the divinely appointed means (K); the qualifier is editorial and distinguishes another use of presumption.

Boundary: Hope is not temperament, optimism, prediction, or confidence that every temporal project will succeed. Fear of God can assist hope; servile terror that drives one away from God cannot.

Despair and presumption are not intrinsic quantities of hope toward God. Aquinas instead locates their mean accidentally and relative to us: despair withdraws from the attainable supernatural good, while presumption expects it by a false mode of reliance (ST I–II, q. 64, a. 4). Hope can therefore grow without approaching presumption: greater hope relies more, not less, upon God's help and more faithfully embraces repentance, prayer, sacrament, and persevering action.

3.3 Charity (*caritas*)

Class and provenance: Principal and greatest theological virtue; Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25 and *On Christian Doctrine* I.35–40; ST I–II, q. 62, a. 3; II–II, q. 23, aa. 1, 3, 6; CCC 1822–1829.

Formal object: God loved for God's own sake as the common good of beatitude, and the neighbor—including oneself—loved in God.

Characteristic act: To love God above all things with the friendship made possible by God's self-communication, and to will and do the neighbor's true good for God's sake.

Defect-side opposition: **Hatred of God** is the named direct contrary (K); disordered self-love and hatred of neighbor oppose commanded acts and the order of charity.

Excess-side opposition: No intrinsic excess exists in the divine object (NA). Partiality, possessiveness, and indulgence of wrongdoing are corruptions of love, not an excess of charity.

Boundary: Charity is not benevolent feeling alone, erotic desire, mere sociability, or indiscriminate approval. It can command correction, sacrifice, mercy, justice, and fortitude because it wills an objective good.

Charity is friendship with God because grace establishes a shared life: God communicates beatitude, and the person responds by a love of benevolence that becomes mutual. Its unity does not flatten the order of love. God is loved as the source and end; oneself and one's neighbor are loved as sharers, actual or possible, in that good. Nearness, responsibility, need, and the common good can order acts of service without making one human life intrinsically disposable.

Charity is called the "form" of the virtues not as their species but as their supernatural final orientation. Prudence still judges, justice still renders what is due, and temperance still moderates appetite; charity commands their acts toward friendship with God. A technically correct act lacking charity can retain an acquired moral goodness while failing to be a living act proportioned to supernatural beatitude.

3.4 Theological synthesis

Faith without hope would know an end without stretching toward it; hope without charity could seek beatitude chiefly as one's own possession; charity loves the God whom faith knows and hope awaits. Yet none is a stage discarded by the next. In the pilgrim state, living charity presupposes faith and hope. In vision, faith gives way to sight and hope to possession, while charity remains (1 Cor. 13:8–13; ST I–II, q. 67).

The theological triad also disciplines the later catalogue. Religious observance is not faith; confidence before danger is not hope; affability and friendship are not charity. Those moral excellences can be commanded and vivified by the theological virtues, but their proximate objects remain distinct.

4 The Four Cardinal Virtues

The traditional name *cardinal* marks four virtues as pivotal or principal within the human moral order. It does not place them above the theological virtues, whose immediately divine object exceeds the proportion of human virtue. Aquinas counts prudence with the moral virtues in this context because, although prudence perfects practical reason, its complete act presupposes rectitude of appetite and directs the moral virtues in action (ST I–II, q. 61, a. 1; CCC 1805).

4.1 Why there are four

There are four because the good defined by reason is realized in four principal ways. It is present first in practical reason itself; it is then imposed upon outward operations and upon the passions, which can draw a person beyond reason through attraction or draw a person away from reason through fear and difficulty. The same fourfold number appears from their principal subjects: practical reason, will, irascible appetite, and concupiscible appetite (ST I–II, q. 61, a. 2).

Cardinal virtue	Principal subject	Formal domain	Principal act
Prudence	Practical reason	The concrete good to be done	Counsel, judge, and chiefly command the fitting act
Justice	Will	What is due to another in equality or proportion	Render each person and community what is due
Fortitude	Irascible appetite	Grave difficulty, especially fear and daring before danger	Endure and, when reason requires, attack without abandoning the good
Temperance	Concupiscible appetite	Attractions and pleasures that can exceed rational measure	Moderate desire and enjoyment according to the whole human good

This is the received order of exposition: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. It is not a descending scale of excellence. Prudence directs the moral act; justice establishes rectitude toward another; fortitude preserves the good against withdrawal under difficulty; temperance preserves it against disordered attraction. Aquinas therefore says that the remaining moral virtues are reducible to these four by subject or by formal principle, without implying that every virtue is a subjective species or named potential part of one of them (ST I–II, q. 61, a. 2, ad 3).

4.2 Integral, subjective, and potential parts

Aquinas uses *part* in three different senses. Confusing them makes conditions, species, and secondary virtues appear coordinate when they are not (ST II–II, q. 48, a. 1).

Integral parts

Conditions whose concurrence is needed for the complete act of a virtue. As walls, roof, and foundation complete

a house, memory, docility, foresight, and the other prudential integrals complete prudent action. An integral condition does not thereby become another coordinate virtue.

Subjective parts

Genuine species in which the account of the whole virtue is realized under distinct formal objects. Personal, regnative, political, domestic, and military prudence are subjective species; distributive and commutative justice specify particular justice.

Potential parts

Secondary virtues connected with a principal virtue because they exercise part of its characteristic mode in a secondary act or less principal matter. Euboulia shares prudence's direction but perfects counsel rather than command; religion shares justice's rendering of a due but cannot establish equality with God.

In this reference, *annexed virtue* ordinarily names a potential part unless the cited source gives a more exact relation. A principal virtue, its species, and its potential parts can all require dossiers, but their rows are taxonomic entries rather than a set of mutually coordinate habits. Integral conditions remain visible under their principal and receive no independent virtue row merely as integrals.

How the four families are organized

The prudence family follows Aquinas's explicit integral, subjective, and potential division (ST II-II, q. 48, a. 1). Justice distinguishes its integral acts, its general and particular structures, and the virtues annexed where equality or strict legal due is incomplete (ST II-II, q. 80, a. 1); equity is a subjective part of justice in general and corresponds especially to legal justice (q. 120, a. 2). Fortitude's supporting realities can be quasi-integral in its proper matter and distinct annexed virtues in secondary difficult matters (q. 128, a. 1). Temperance has integral conditions, subjective species concerning pleasures of touch, and potential parts that extend rational moderation to secondary matters (q. 143, a. 1).

4.3 Specific habits, general conditions, and modes

The four names can also signify general conditions found throughout virtuous life: sound discrimination, rectitude in what is due, rational measure, and firmness. Aquinas nevertheless identifies prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude as distinct habits through their determinate principal matters. He also describes the quality of one connected virtue as "overflowing" into another. Neither usage multiplies the four habits (ST I-II, q. 61, aa. 3-4).

Likewise, four inherited modes concern different standpoints or states in which the cardinal names are predicated; they do not produce sixteen additional human virtues (ST I-II, q. 61, a. 5).

Mode	Standpoint	What the cardinal names express	Census consequence
Social or political	Embodied life with others	Rational order in action, debts, danger, and appetite	The ordinary four cardinal virtues
Perfecting or purifying	A person tending toward divine likeness	Detachment and reordering on the way to a higher good	A mode of the same four, not four new rows
Perfect or purified-soul	The soul conformed to the higher good	The four names applied to perfected stability in that state	A perfected mode, not four new species
Exemplar	God as intelligible pattern	Divine wisdom, order, immutability, and self-direction named analogically	Exemplars, not created human habits

4.4 The cardinal virtues as ordered love

Augustine supplies the governing Christian orientation without erasing these distinctions. He presents temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence as different operations of rightly ordered love cleaving to God: love preserved whole, love bearing difficulty, love serving the true order, and love discerning what helps or hinders the final end (*On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25). This interpretation orders the four toward God; it does not reduce them to four synonyms for charity.

Love therefore needs truth and order. Intensity alone does not make an attachment charity. *City of God* XV.22 defines virtue through the order of love: what is higher, equal, and lower must be loved in fitting relation. Faith knows the divine good; hope stretches toward it; charity loves it; prudence discerns; justice renders; fortitude holds fast; temperance preserves the order of desire.

5 Prudence: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts

Prudence (Greek *phronesis*, Latin *prudentia*) is simultaneously an intellectual virtue and the first cardinal family. It perfects practical reason for action, while the other moral virtues make the appetites receptive to its rule. Aquinas organizes its integral conditions, species or scopes, annexed virtues, and opposed failures in ST II–II, qq. 47–56, receiving Aristotle’s account in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.

5.1 The principal cardinal and personal prudence

5.1.1 Prudence

Class and provenance: Principal cardinal and practical-intellectual virtue, also personal prudence or *prudentia simpliciter* when contrasted with its social species; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5 and VI.12–13; Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25; ST I–II, qq. 57–58; II–II, q. 47, a. 11; q. 48, a. 1; qq. 49–56; CCC 1806.

Formal object: The contingent, practicable human good in the concrete: not simply what can be done, but what ought to be done here and now for the right end.

Characteristic act: To take counsel, judge the fitting means, and command their timely execution under right reason. Command is principal because practical truth must issue in action.

Defect-side opposition: **Imprudence** is the special contrary vice (K). Its principal species corrupt counsel through precipitation, judgment through thoughtlessness, or command through inconstancy and negligence (ST II–II, q. 53, a. 2).

Excess-side opposition: No quantitative excess of prudence exists (NA). Craftiness, worldly prudence, and undue solicitude are counterfeits (X) that retain practical calculation while changing the end or rule.

Boundary: Prudence is neither caution, calculation, cleverness, conscience, nor technical expertise. *Synderesis* supplies the habitual grasp of first practical principles; conscience applies knowledge to a particular act; prudence judges and commands well.

Prudential reasoning has three principal movements. **Counsel** investigates possible means; **judgment** selects what fits the end and circumstances; **command** applies the judgment in action. Good intention without adequate counsel can be reckless, endless consultation without judgment can be evasive, and correct judgment without command can remain morally sterile. Prudence is therefore practical truth in agreement with right appetite, not simply accurate prediction.

5.2 Integral parts of complete prudential action

The eight integral conditions

Aquinas's eight integral parts name what complete prudential action needs (ST II–II, q. 49): **memory** faithful to experienced particulars; **understanding** of the present practical situation and first principles; **docility** receptive to teachable authority and experience; **shrewdness** (*solertia*) able to discover promptly for oneself; **reason** comparing means; **foresight** ordering them to the end; **circumspection** attending to circumstances; and **caution** avoiding evils entangled with otherwise good action. They are constitutive conditions of one complete habit here, not eight coordinate cardinal virtues.

5.3 Subjective species: prudence for self and communities

Prudence differs by the whole whose good practical reason directs. Prudence without a qualifier—personal prudence or *prudentia simpliciter*—orders one's own life; Aquinas distinguishes it specifically from prudence directed to a multitude (ST II–II, q. 47, a. 11; q. 48, a. 1). He then distinguishes four social species by formally different common-good objects (q. 50). Because they are expressly species rather than mere jobs or applications, each receives a counted subordinate dossier. Their shared act of right practical direction explains their unity without erasing their specific objects.

Subjective species	Whole directed	Visible treatment
Personal prudence	One person's whole life and good action	The principal dossier above; one row, not an omitted fifth species
Regnative prudence	The political community under directive governance	Distinct subordinate dossier
Political prudence	A free participant's action toward the political common good	Distinct subordinate dossier
Domestic prudence	The household as an intermediate community	Distinct subordinate dossier
Military prudence	The community's rational defense against attack	Distinct subordinate dossier

5.3.1 Regnative prudence

Class and provenance: Thomistic subjective species of prudence with Aristotle's legislative or architectonic prudence as antecedent; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.8; ST II–II, q. 48, a. 1; q. 50, a. 1.

Formal object: The common good of a complete political community insofar as it must be directed through law and authoritative governance.

Characteristic act: To frame and command just common measures, coordinating persons, offices, and subordinate goods toward civic flourishing.

Defect-side opposition: A corresponding species of **imprudence** opposes this social scope, but Aquinas supplies no separate proper noun for it (U).

Excess-side opposition: **Tyranny** redirects public power to private advantage and is a counterfeit of governance (X), not excessive regnative prudence.

Boundary: The historical title does not restrict the virtue to monarchy: Aquinas extends its directive logic to rightful forms of government and identifies legislation as its principal act. It differs from legal justice, which executes and orders acts to the common good.

5.3.2 Political prudence

Class and provenance: Subjective species of prudence; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.8; ST II–II, q. 48, a. 1; q. 50, a. 2.

Formal object: The common good of political life as it specifies a free participant’s practical self-direction under legitimate common rule.

Characteristic act: To deliberate, judge, and act as a responsible member of the community, translating sound common direction into one’s own free action.

Defect-side opposition: A corresponding species of **imprudence** opposes this social scope, but Aquinas supplies no separate proper noun for it (U).

Excess-side opposition: Factionalism subjects the common good to a part and counterfeits political prudence (X); it is not an excess of the virtue.

Boundary: Political prudence is neither passive conformity nor expert knowledge of policy. It concerns a citizen’s self-government toward the common good and remains bounded by justice and higher law.

5.3.3 Domestic or economic prudence

Class and provenance: Subjective species of prudence; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.8; ST II–II, q. 48, a. 1; q. 50, a. 3.

Formal object: The common good of a household as a community of persons whose life requires ordered relationships, responsibilities, and material means.

Characteristic act: To govern household choices and resources so that wealth and work serve the good life of the persons and relationships entrusted to the household.

Defect-side opposition: A corresponding species of **imprudence** opposes this social scope, but Aquinas supplies no separate proper noun for it (U).

Excess-side opposition: Domination and acquisitiveness corrupt the household’s end and counterfeit its direction (X); they are not excess prudence.

Boundary: Domestic prudence is not household finance alone: riches are instruments, not its final end. It is distinct from both personal prudence and political prudence because the household is a whole between person and polity.

5.3.4 Military prudence

Class and provenance: Thomistic subjective species of prudence; ST II–II, q. 48, a. 1; q. 50, a. 4. Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* III.8 distinguishes apparent civic or military courage from true fortitude, and VI.8 supplies only the wider political-prudence setting, not this named species.

Formal object: The common good insofar as a political community must rationally direct its defense against hostile attack.

Characteristic act: To counsel, plan, command, and coordinate defensive action under just political ends and proportionate means.

Defect-side opposition: A corresponding species of **imprudence** opposes this social scope, but Aquinas supplies no separate proper noun for it (U). Mere lack of technical skill is not automatically moral vice.

Excess-side opposition: **Aggression** abandons the defensive common-good object and counterfeits military direction (X); it is not an excess of the virtue.

Boundary: Military art governs the skilled use of instruments, fortitude executes steadfastly amid danger, and military prudence directs the whole action toward the common good. The virtue cannot make an unjust war or means prudent.

5.4 Potential parts: counsel and judgment

5.4.1 Euboulia (good counsel)

Class and provenance: Potential part of prudence; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.9; ST I–II, q. 57, a. 6; II–II, q. 51, aa. 1–2.

Formal object: Possible means to a right practical end, considered under the work of inquiry.

Characteristic act: To investigate fitting means well: toward the right end, by sound steps, with adequate scope, and in due time.

Defect-side opposition: **Precipitation** or temerity is the named failure of counsel opposed to euboulia (K); it rushes past steps that right inquiry requires.

Excess-side opposition: No dedicated excess-side vice belongs to euboulia (U); vacillation is a different failure to reach judgment, not perfected counsel carried too far.

Boundary: Good counsel does not itself judge or command. A clever proposal for an evil end is not euboulia, and accidental success does not retroactively make inquiry sound.

Speed alone neither proves nor disproves good counsel. Experience can make a well-formed judgment swift; a novel, grave, or irreversible choice can require extended inquiry. The measure is the practical end and the inquiry actually needed, not a temperamentally preferred tempo.

5.4.2 Synesis (sound judgment)

Class and provenance: Potential part of prudence; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.10; ST I–II, q. 57, a. 6; II–II, q. 51, a. 3.

Formal object: Ordinary matters of action as judged under the common rules of practical reason.

Characteristic act: To judge correctly that a proposed action fits the relevant moral principles and circumstances.

Defect-side opposition: **Thoughtlessness** or inconsiderateness is the named failure of judgment opposed to synesis (K); it neglects what right judgment must consider.

Excess-side opposition: No dedicated excess-side vice belongs to synesis (U); censoriousness misuses judgment about persons rather than perfecting *synesis* beyond measure.

Boundary: *Synesis* evaluates ordinary cases after counsel; it is not theoretical science, juridical authority, or the final command belonging to prudence.

5.4.3 Gnome (higher judgment)

Class and provenance: Potential part of prudence; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.11; ST I–II, q. 57, a. 6; II–II, q. 51, a. 4.

Formal object: Exceptional practical cases that must be judged by higher principles when an ordinary rule does not adequately reach the concrete good.

Characteristic act: To recognize and judge an exceptional case according to the higher reason presupposed by a sound general rule.

Defect-side opposition: **Thoughtlessness** is the shared named failure of judgment, but Aquinas supplies no dedicated contrary unique to gnome (U). Rigid adherence to a formulation is an explanatory failure, not a source-fixed noun.

Excess-side opposition: **Arbitrariness** counterfeits higher judgment by abandoning law and reason (X); it is not excessive gnome.

Boundary: *Gnome* is not a personal exemption, inspiration without reasons, or equity as a juridical act; it perfects judgment wherever the exceptional case requires higher practical principles.

5.5 Prudence, law, and uncertainty

Prudence works with moral certitude proportioned to contingent action. It does not wait for the demonstrative necessity proper to mathematics, yet it must not rename impulse as discernment. Relevant facts, competent counsel, duties, foreseeable consequences, and the hierarchy of goods all matter. Some uncertainty can remain after the best available inquiry; a prudent command then acts on the strongest practical reasons while remaining teachable about effects and changed circumstances.

No virtue can make an intrinsically wrongful object prudent. Nor does a good end sanctify dishonest means. Prudence integrates object, intention, circumstances, law, and concrete responsibility; it never serves as an escape hatch from them.

6 Justice: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts

Justice perfects the will in relation to another. Its basic act is to render what is due; its measure therefore lies in an objective equality or proportion, not first in a mean of passion. Aristotle develops general and particular justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* V. Aquinas receives that distinction and places under justice the virtues that concern a due relation but cannot establish strict equality with their recipient, together with lesser social dues (ST II-II, qq. 57–122).

6.1 The principal virtue and its objective mean

6.1.1 Justice

Class and provenance: Principal cardinal virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* V.1–10; Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25; ST I-II, q. 61; II-II, qq. 57–79; CCC 1807.

Formal object: The right or thing due to another, whether by equality, proportion, office, promise, law, or the order of the common good.

Characteristic act: By a constant and firm will, to render to each person and community what is due.

Defect-side opposition: **Injustice** is the contrary genus in the responsible will (K). In a particular transaction, an unjust loss or shortfall is an objective outcome (O), not a vice in the person deprived.

Excess-side opposition: An unjust gain or surplus is the opposite objective outcome (O); the wrongdoer's grasping (Greek *pleonexia*) is not "too much justice."

Boundary: Justice concerns an objective due and outward action even when passions are calm. Judgment and restitution are acts of justice; law is a rule and measure; mercy and equity perfect rather than cancel what justice seeks.

In moral virtues measured chiefly by passion, the agent's response is excessive or deficient. In justice, the equality itself stands between more and less. A court may restore a loss without the victim thereby acquiring a "defect vice," and a generous gift beyond strict debt need not be unjust. The appendix therefore names objective loss and gain where they apply, labels them as outcomes rather than habits, and separately records injustice as the responsible agent's contrary vice.

Integral parts: doing good and declining evil

Justice has two integral acts: to do the good that is due and to decline the evil that violates another's due (ST II-II, q. 79, a. 1). They are required for complete justice but do not become two additional virtues. "Doing good" is especially tied to justice's affirmative act; "declining evil" sets the minimum boundary without exhausting the positive due.

6.2 General or legal justice

6.2.1 Legal or general justice

Class and provenance: General ordering of virtue to the common good and, in Aquinas, a virtue with this directive power; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* V.1-2; ST II-II, q. 58, aa. 5-6.

Formal object: The common good under a just ordering of law and civic responsibility.

Characteristic act: To direct the acts of every virtue, insofar as they bear upon others, toward the community's just good.

Defect-side opposition: **Lawlessness** or injustice is the contrary orientation (K), not one side of the loss-and-gain structure proper to particular justice.

Excess-side opposition: **Tyranny** invokes a purported common good while subordinating it to private advantage; it is counterfeit rule (X), not legal justice in excess.

Boundary: General justice does not absorb the elicited acts of courage, temperance, or charity. It commands them toward the common good while their proximate objects continue to specify their own virtues.

The common good is not merely the aggregate of private satisfactions, nor is it an excuse to erase personal dignity and subsidiary responsibility. Legal justice asks how one's acts participate in a shared just order. It presupposes that law itself is measured by reason and the genuine good; compliance with an unjust command does not become virtue because authority uttered it.

6.3 Equity and severity in relation to legal justice

6.3.1 Equity (*epieikeia*)

Class and provenance: Subjective part of justice in general, corresponding properly to legal justice; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* V.10; ST II-II, q. 120, aa. 1-2. Aquinas also calls it a higher rule of human acts when justice is taken more broadly.

Formal object: The just intention of law when universal wording cannot fittingly govern an exceptional case.

Characteristic act: To set aside the letter in the exceptional case so as to fulfill the higher justice the lawmaker intended.

Defect-side opposition: Rigid literalism can destroy a law's reason, but the sources supply no dedicated vice noun for this failure (U).

Excess-side opposition: **Arbitrariness** counterfeits equity by abandoning both letter and rational intention (X); it is not an excess of equity.

Boundary: Equity is neither ordinary dispensation, civil disobedience at will, nor a denial that clear law normally binds. It differs from *gnome*: higher judgment perfects practical reason generally; equity performs justice in relation to law.

6.3.2 Severity

Class and provenance: Virtue and part of legal justice in the application of punishment; ST II–II, q. 157, a. 2, ad 1.

Formal object: A penalty due under law and right reason for the protection, correction, and order of the common good.

Characteristic act: To remain firm in imposing or maintaining the punishment right reason requires when no particular circumstance warrants mitigation.

Defect-side opposition: Culpable remission can fail justice, but the source gives severity no dedicated defect-side vice (U).

Excess-side opposition: **Cruelty** corrupts rational punishment (X); it is clemency's direct contrary, not severity perfected too far.

Boundary: Severity is not harshness. It and clemency are both ruled by reason: severity holds to a due penalty; clemency rationally mitigates it where a particular consideration warrants. Vindication concerns the morally ordered pursuit of redress, while equity reaches the law's just intention in an exceptional case.

6.4 Particular justice

Particular justice renders a determinate due to another rather than commanding the acts of all virtues toward the common good. It is the non-counted parent genus of two subjective species: distributive justice orders a whole's allocation to its members; commutative justice orders dealings of one party with another (ST II–II, q. 58, a. 7; q. 61, a. 1).

6.4.1 Distributive justice

Class and provenance: Subjective species of particular justice; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* V.3; ST II–II, q. 61, a. 1–2.

Formal object: Common goods, honors, burdens, risks, and resources assigned to persons according to the proportion relevant to the community and good distributed.

Characteristic act: To allot shares by a just proportion rather than private favor or irrelevant status.

Defect-side opposition: A **disproportionate shortfall** is the deprived party's objective outcome (O), not that party's vice; in the distributor, partiality corrupts the proportion.

Excess-side opposition: A **disproportionate surplus** is the favored party's objective outcome (O); collusion can make a recipient culpable, but quantity alone does not name a second habit.

Boundary: Distributive equality is proportional rather than automatically identical. Relevant need, contribution, office, risk, and equal dignity must not be collapsed into one numerical rule.

6.4.2 Commutative justice

Class and provenance: Subjective species of particular justice; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* V.4–5; ST II–II, q. 61, aa. 1–4; q. 62.

Formal object: What one person owes another in exchange, damage, taking, contract, or restitution.

Characteristic act: To preserve or restore arithmetic equality between parties by performance, payment, return, or proportionate reparation.

Defect-side opposition: A party's **loss** is the deficient objective outcome (O), not a vice in the injured party.

Excess-side opposition: The corresponding **gain** identifies objective inequality (O); fraud, theft, coercion, and usury name different wrongful acts, not an "excess of commutative justice."

Boundary: Restitution repairs an objective disorder but does not by itself erase every further duty, penalty, scandal, or need for forgiveness. Commutative justice is not market price treated as an infallible moral oracle.

6.4.3 Penance (as a virtue)

Class and provenance: Special infused moral virtue directly within justice and, by its voluntary compensation for offense, comprised under commutative justice; ST III, q. 85, aa. 1–6. This is Thomistic provenance; the work cited as Augustine in one objection is not used to establish Augustinian authorship.

Formal object: One's past sin considered as a remediable offense against God: not the impossible erasure of the historical deed, but the disorder, guilt, and debt toward which grace-enabled amendment and satisfaction are directed.

Characteristic act: To detest the past sin by a right act of will, purpose a changed life, and cooperate with God through fitting amendment and voluntary satisfaction. Charity commands the act toward reconciliation with God, while penance elicits its special work.

Defect-side opposition: **Impenitence**, understood as the purpose not to repent, is a named contrary (K; ST II–II, q. 14, a. 2), though it is not one half of a quantitative mean-pair.

Excess-side opposition: No intrinsic excess-side vice exists (NA). The "excess" named in ST III, q. 85, a. 3, ad 2 means doing all one can toward a superior whom one cannot repay equally; self-harm, despair, and scrupulosity are other disorders.

Boundary: Penance as virtue is a habit in the will, not sensitive sorrow, tears, shame, self-loathing, a single penitential work, or the sacrament bearing the same name. The sacramental reference treats the sacrament's sign and rite; this dossier controls the virtue that can dispose, animate, or accompany its human acts.

One virtue, sacramental parts, and context-conditioned species

ST III, q. 90 requires three distinctions. First, **contrition, confession, and satisfaction** are integral parts of the sacrament's human matter; they are not three additional virtues (aa. 1–3). Second, q. 90, a. 4 calls penance before baptism, after baptismal mortal sin, and for venial sin "species" of the virtue according to the change intended: regeneration, restoration after grave sin, or advance toward more perfect operation. The inventory records that express language, but does not print three additional habit rows: these are context-conditioned specifications of the one virtue's act, not three separately named stable habits. Third, the pre-baptismal act is not the sacrament of Penance, while post-baptismal sacramental acts presuppose the Church's sacramental order. In every case, the virtue remains in the will and is governed by amendment of sin as offense against God.

6.5 Potential parts: dues without full equality

Some relations contain a real debt that cannot be repaid by strict equality. Aquinas calls the corresponding virtues potential parts of justice: they share justice's other-directed act but fall short of its equal return. Their order follows the excellence of the person to whom the debt is owed.

Unequal debts: religion, piety, and observance

6.5.1 Religion (*religio*)

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice and a distinct moral virtue; ST II–II, qq. 80–100; Augustine, *On True Religion* 55.

Formal object: The honor and service owed to God as first principle, sovereign good, and governor of all.

Characteristic act: To offer worship—interior and exterior—under truth: devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, vows, and reverent use of holy realities.

Defect-side opposition: **Irreligion** is the source-exact contrary by deficiency in due divine worship; sacrilege, tempting God, perjury, and simony specify failures in that field (M).

Excess-side opposition: **Superstition** offers worship to a false object or offers the true God worship in a gravely false manner (M).

Boundary: Religion is not a theological virtue: it has worship of God as its act, whereas faith, hope, and charity have God immediately as supernatural object. Devotional intensity does not authorize magic, false revelation, or injustice.

6.5.2 Piety (*pietas*)

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice; ST II–II, q. 101; the natural debt is received from parents and country.

Formal object: Parents, kindred, and one's political community insofar as they are principles of life, nurture, and common identity.

Characteristic act: To give fitting honor, service, and support while preserving higher duties to God and justice.

Defect-side opposition: Dereliction may describe abandoning a due of care, but the source gives piety no dedicated vice noun on this side (U).

Excess-side opposition: **Favoritism** that injures a higher or equal duty is a corruption of partiality (X), not piety made too strong.

Boundary: Piety does not demand compliance with wrongdoing, concealment of abuse, nationalism, or treating inherited custom as divine law. It differs from the gift of piety.

6.5.3 Observance (*observantia*)

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice; ST II–II, q. 102. *Dulia* and obedience specify acts within its field.

Formal object: Persons who bear excellence or public dignity and mediate a real common good.

Characteristic act: To accord fitting honor and service according to office, excellence, and the order of justice.

Defect-side opposition: Contempt can withhold due honor, but Aquinas supplies no dedicated defect vice for observance (U).

Excess-side opposition: Adulation directed to power counterfeits honor through flattery and falsehood (X); it is not heightened observance.

Boundary: The due follows real office and good, not celebrity, wealth, intimidation, or a claim to immunity. Honor never cancels accountability.

Dulia and obedience under observance

6.5.4 *Dulia*

Class and provenance: Special species within observance; ST II–II, q. 103. The traditional term names due service or honor to a superior creature; *latria* belongs to God alone.

Formal object: A human superior or, in developed Christian usage, a holy creature honored for participation in God's gifts.

Characteristic act: To render subordinate honor without transferring to a creature the worship due to God.

Defect-side opposition: Disdain can refuse a due honor but does not furnish a source-given dedicated flank (U).

Excess-side opposition: Adulation or creature-worship corrupts the due relation (X); it is not excessive *dulia*.

Boundary: *Dulia* is analogical service, not slavery of conscience. It is formally distinct from *latria*; honor terminates differently according to the excellence and relation recognized.

Strict *dulia*, wide *dulia*, and hyper*dulia*

ST II–II, q. 103, a. 4 distinguishes two uses. **Strict *dulia*** is the one virtue by which a servant renders a human lord due service; it is a species of observance and is not further divided. ***Dulia* in a wide sense** names reverence for human excellence generally and therefore ranges over already distinguished virtues such as piety and observance. **Hyper*dulia*** is the highest species of that wide usage, the singular reverence owed to the Blessed Virgin because of her affinity to God. It receives explicit treatment here but no additional census row: Aquinas locates it within the wide analogical grouping, not as a species of the one strict habit. None is *latria*, the worship owed to God alone.

6.5.5 Obedience

Class and provenance: Distinct virtue annexed to observance; ST II–II, q. 104.

Formal object: A legitimate command insofar as the commander’s authority participates in a just order.

Characteristic act: To fulfill a lawful precept because it is commanded by one with authority.

Defect-side opposition: **Disobedience** is the special contrary sin when a precept is treated with contempt (K; ST II–II, qq. 104–105).

Excess-side opposition: **Indiscreet obedience** is Aquinas’s phrase for obeying a person or matter one ought not (U; ST II–II, q. 104, a. 5). It names a circumstantial excess, not a dedicated one-word vice or obedience perfected beyond measure.

Boundary: Obedience is bounded by the superior’s competence and by higher law. Counsel, voluntary service, coercion, and mere conformity are not identical with its elicited act.

Necessary moral dues among equals and neighbors

The remaining potential parts render things owed by moral fittingness rather than an enforceable equality in every instance. Their lesser strictness does not make them optional decorations: shared life disintegrates when benefits, truth, sociability, or proportionate defense are persistently refused.

6.5.6 Gratitude

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice; ST II–II, qq. 106–107.

Formal object: A benefactor and the gratuitous good received, considered according to the giver’s intention, cost, and the recipient’s need.

Characteristic act: To recognize the benefit, give thanks, and make a fitting return at a fitting time when possible.

Defect-side opposition: **Ingratitude** is the special contrary vice by deficiency, with failures of recognition, thanks, and fitting return as degrees (K).

Excess-side opposition: An unnamed excess returns thanks for what is not due or sooner than it is due (U; ST II–II, q. 107, a. 2). A larger fitting return can still be excellent.

Boundary: Gratitude is not a commercial discharge that makes grace cease to be gift. It does not bind the recipient to conceal the benefactor’s later injustice.

6.5.7 Vindication (proportionate vengeance)

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice; ST II–II, q. 108. The traditional *vindicta* concerns morally ordered redress, not private rage.

Formal object: A culpable wrong and the restoration of justice, protection, correction, and peace through proportionate penalty.

Characteristic act: To resist or punish wrongdoing under lawful authority and a just intention directed to the good.

Defect-side opposition: **Remissness** culpably abandons necessary defense, correction, or public order (M by Aquinas’s explicit excess-and-defect account).

Excess-side opposition: **Brutality** exceeds rational proportion in punishment (M); Aquinas gives cruelty as an alternative term, but the appendix prefers brutality here so that cruelty can retain its distinct direct relation to clemency.

Boundary: Vindication is not hatred, retaliation for emotional satisfaction, or denial of mercy. Forgiveness of personal resentment can coexist with restitution, protection, and public penalty.

6.5.8 Truthfulness

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice and Aristotelian mean; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.7; ST II–II, qq. 109–113.

Formal object: The manifestation of oneself in signs, deeds, and speech according to what one is and knows.

Characteristic act: To signify truthfully without making oneself greater or lesser than one is.

Defect-side opposition: **Eironeia** or false self-deprecation falsely diminishes one's qualities or deeds (M); the Greek term prevents modern "irony" from obscuring the technical sense.

Excess-side opposition: **Boastfulness** falsely magnifies them (M).

Boundary: Truthfulness does not require revealing every truth to everyone. Discretion, confidentiality, silence, and material concealment differ from assertion of falsehood; legal testimony carries additional duties.

Dues conducive to fuller rectitude

Affability and liberality concern goods that improve shared life beyond a strictly enforceable return: fitting social pleasantness and fitting readiness with external goods. Their looser juridical status does not make them optional to full moral rectitude.

6.5.9 Affability (social friendship)

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice and Aristotelian mean; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.6; ST II–II, qq. 114–116.

Formal object: The ordinary pleasure, pain, words, and conduct through which people share social life.

Characteristic act: To be agreeable or corrective as truth, relationship, and the common good reasonably require.

Defect-side opposition: **Quarrelsomeness** needlessly opposes and gives pain in ordinary association (M).

Excess-side opposition: **Obsequiousness** seeks to please against truth or another's good (M); flattery is its gain-seeking form in Aquinas's analysis.

Boundary: Affability is not theological charity, intimate friendship, conflict avoidance, or personality-based extroversion. Fraternal correction can be its act when pleasing would harm.

6.5.10 Liberality

Class and provenance: Potential part of justice and Aristotelian character virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.1; ST II–II, qq. 117–119.

Formal object: Ordinary external goods considered as instruments to be given, received, kept, and spent under reason.

Characteristic act: To release and use possessions readily for fitting persons, ends, amounts, and times.

Defect-side opposition: **Avarice** clings to wealth or takes it contrary to reason (M).

Excess-side opposition: **Prodigality** dissipates resources contrary to their fitting purposes and obligations (M).

Boundary: Liberality differs from justice's strict payment of debt and from magnificence's great expenditure for a great work. Poverty, wealth, or the size of a gift alone does not establish the habit.

How Aquinas reduces the longer justice lists

ST II–II, q. 80, a. 1 reports several inherited catalogues and then classifies their names rather than simply adding them. **Innocence** belongs to justice's integral work of declining evil. External **friendship** is affability; interior **concord**, **benevolence**, and **beneficence** are relations or acts of friendship and charity. **Obedience** is first included under observance, then q. 104 establishes its own special virtue; **fidelity** is contained in truthfulness, while **discipline** toward inferiors is a duty reducible to the reported humanity or beneficence. **Holiness** and **eusebeia** coincide here with religion; *eucharistia* is gratitude. **Kindliness**, **humanity**, and **condescension**

reduce to beneficence, liberality, or affability according to their act. **Just exchange** and **legislative justice** are commutative and legal justice; **good judgment** or *eugnomyne* is referred to gnome as director and to justice or equity as executor; and the reported **equity** returns to *epieikeia* or affability according to sense. Piety, religion, gratitude, vindication, liberality, truthfulness, and the later independent treatment of obedience remain counted once. These reductions are named so that comprehensiveness does not turn aliases, acts, integrals, and genera into duplicate habits.

6.6 Justice corrected by neither sentiment nor mechanism

Justice without charity can become externally exact while indifferent to communion; sentiment without justice can favor the near, visible, or agreeable while neglecting a genuine due. Mercy attends to misery, equity to a universal rule's exceptional failure, and vindication to ordered redress. Each requires prudence. None permits a private actor to assume authority the actor does not possess.

7 Fortitude: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts

Fortitude perfects the irascible appetite where a rational good is hard to attain or defend. Its primary act is endurance: attack is valuable when needed, but steadfastness under grave evil most directly prevents fear from driving reason away from the good. Aristotle treats courage and several virtues of aspiration and expenditure in *Nicomachean Ethics* III–IV; Aquinas orders fortitude and its annexed virtues in ST II–II, qq. 123–140.

7.1 The principal virtue: endurance and attack

7.1.1 Fortitude (courage)

Class and provenance: Principal cardinal virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and III.6–9; Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25; ST II–II, qq. 123–127; CCC 1808.

Formal object: Fear and daring before grave dangers, paradigmatically death faced for a just and proportionately great good.

Characteristic act: To stand firm and, when reason requires, to attack danger rather than abandon the good through fear.

Defect-side opposition: Cowardice yields to fear against right reason (M).

Excess-side opposition: Rashness rushes into danger through disordered daring or deficient fear (M).

Boundary: Fearlessness from ignorance, anger, compulsion, experience, or confidence in superior force can resemble courage without being its act. Martyrdom is a chief act of fortitude, not a separate moral virtue.

Fortitude neither suppresses all fear nor seeks danger as proof of identity. Fear can accurately register a great evil; virtue keeps that perception within the hierarchy of goods. A prudent retreat, protective concealment, or appeal for help can be courageous when it preserves the true end. A spectacular exposure that serves vanity or needlessly endangers dependents is rash even when the agent feels no fear.

7.2 Quasi-integral requirements in fortitude's proper matter

Confidence and security

In the most difficult matter of fortitude, **confidence** supports attack and **security** steadies the person against fear. Aquinas calls them quasi-integral in fortitude's own principal matter while reducing their secondary matters under magnanimity and related virtues (ST II–II, q. 128, a. 1). They are requirements or movements of complete fortitude here, not two additional coordinate habits.

7.3 Annexed virtues for undertaking difficult goods

7.3.1 Magnanimity

Class and provenance: Annexed virtue of fortitude and Aristotelian mean; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.3; ST II–II, qq. 129–133.

Formal object: Great honor as testimony to great moral excellence and to difficult works proportioned to one's God-given powers.

Characteristic act: To undertake what is truly great and worthy while judging one's capacity truthfully and ordering honor to virtue.

Defect-side opposition: **Pusillanimity** shrinks from great things within one's capacity (M).

Excess-side opposition: Three source-named excesses differ by respect: **presumption concerning capacity** undertakes beyond one's powers; **ambition** desires honor inordinately; and **vainglory** desires glory inordinately (M).

Boundary: One rational mean can be exceeded under several circumstances or formal respects. Magnanimity is compatible with humility: humility restrains claims beyond truth before God; magnanimity refuses to bury gifts entrusted for great service. It is not dominance, celebrity, or self-sufficiency.

7.3.2 Magnificence

Class and provenance: Annexed virtue of fortitude and Aristotelian mean; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.2; ST II–II, qq. 134–135.

Formal object: Large expenditure ordered to a proportionately great, durable, or public work.

Characteristic act: To conceive and complete a great work with expenditure fitting its end, materials, circumstances, and agent.

Defect-side opposition: **Paltriness** spoils a great work by spending beneath its fitting scale or attending to petty savings (M). It is the terse English control for Latin *parvificentia*; “meanness” is a historical alternative with thinner modern precision.

Excess-side opposition: **Waste** is the terse rendering of Aquinas's *consumptio*; Aristotle's *banousia/apetirokalia* adds the connotation of vulgar or tasteless display (M). Both exceed proportion to work, person, and end.

Boundary: Magnificence differs from liberality: both use wealth, but magnificence concerns the greatness of a work rather than ordinary giving. Cost alone cannot make a project magnificent.

7.4 Annexed virtues for enduring difficulty

7.4.1 Patience

Class and provenance: Annexed virtue of fortitude; Augustine, *On Patience*; ST II-II, q. 136.

Formal object: Sorrows and evils endured while remaining faithful to a rational and, in infused virtue, supernatural good.

Characteristic act: To prevent sorrow from overthrowing reason or causing abandonment of the good.

Defect-side opposition: **Impatience** is the named contrary state (K), but Aquinas does not construct a dedicated two-flank mean for patience.

Excess-side opposition: No intrinsic excess-side vice exists (NA). Apathy toward another's suffering is a defect of perception or charity, not excessive patience.

Boundary: Patience is not passivity, approval of abuse, or refusal of proportionate remedy. One can oppose an evil patiently by refusing hatred and remaining governed by the good.

Augustine distinguishes genuine patience by its end: enduring hardship for greed, pride, or crime displays toughness but not virtue. Christian patience receives suffering without treating suffering itself as the supreme good. It can lament, seek justice, protect the vulnerable, and persevere without surrendering reason to sorrow.

7.4.2 Longanimity

Class and provenance: Thomistic virtue formally allied most closely with magnanimity, yet comprised under patience insofar as delay causes sorrow; ST II-II, q. 136, a. 5.

Formal object: A worthy good whose attainment is distant in time and therefore wearisome to desire.

Characteristic act: To sustain the movement of hope toward a delayed good without abandoning the work that prepares for it.

Defect-side opposition: **Impatience at delay** is expressly contrary, but Aquinas establishes no dedicated vice species unique to longanimity (U).

Excess-side opposition: No intrinsic excess-side vice exists (NA); procrastination chooses or causes delay through neglect, whereas longanimity bears a delay.

Boundary: Because it tends through hope toward a distant good, longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than patience. It is nevertheless comprised under patience insofar as delay produces sorrow, and it differs from perseverance's endurance of prolonged difficulty in action.

7.4.3 Perseverance

Class and provenance: Annexed virtue of fortitude; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.7 and VII.9 by analogy and boundary; ST II-II, qq. 137–138.

Formal object: The duration and accumulated difficulty of continuing in a good work to its fitting completion.

Characteristic act: To remain in the good course for as long as reason and the end require.

Defect-side opposition: **Softness** (Latin *mollities*) abandons the good because one cannot bear ordinary toil or loss of pleasure (M). Yielding under an unusually overwhelming pressure does not by itself establish this vice.

Excess-side opposition: **Pertinacity** persists when reason requires stopping, changing means, or yielding a private position (M).

Boundary: The historical technical sense of *mollities* concerns surrender to difficulty and carries no judgment about sex, disability, or gentle temperament. Perseverance is not stubborn attachment to the original tactic.

***Mollities*: one word, distinct classifications**

Aristotle's *malakia* concerns failure to withstand pains that most people can bear; nature, illness, and extraordinary intensity delimit that comparison. Aquinas's *mollities* in ST II-II, q. 138 receives this endurance background

as the defect opposed to perseverance. Aristotle's separate discussion in VII.9 also prevents persistence from becoming stubborn adherence to a false judgment.

The Greek plural *malakoi* in 1 Corinthians 6:9, the Vulgate *molles*, and historical English renderings belong to a vice-list whose translation history is disputed; verse 11 immediately turns to washing, sanctification, and justification. Aquinas's commentary gives the term a sexual reading there. In ST II–II, q. 154, a. 11 he again uses *mollities*, this time as an alternative name for one specifically classified noncopulatory act within his account of lust. Neither use is the perseverance defect of q. 138 merely because the Latin resembles it.

Penitential witnesses are likewise heterogeneous: one checked tariff uses *mollis* sexually, while another uses *mollities* for inability to bear an assigned fast. These philosophical, exegetical, moral-theological, and juridical uses must not be fused into one transhistorical category. None licenses labeling a person or group, inferring culpability from appearance or one act, or mapping the historical vocabulary directly onto modern orientation, gender, disability, temperament, or diagnosis.

7.4.4 Constancy

Class and provenance: Subordinate specification that pertains to perseverance; ST II–II, q. 137, a. 3.

Formal object: External obstacles and changing pressures that threaten a settled good purpose.

Characteristic act: To keep practical commitment stable when opposition, fortune, or surrounding conditions push it away from reason.

Defect-side opposition: Abandoning a purpose under external pressure opposes constancy, but Aquinas supplies no dedicated vice noun for this specification (U); prudential inconstancy has a different formal relation.

Excess-side opposition: **Obstinacy** counterfeits stability by refusing correction when reason changes the judgment (X); it is not excess constancy.

Boundary: Perseverance primarily answers long duration; constancy answers external impediments. Neither requires retaining an erroneous plan after relevant facts or duties change.

7.5 Acts and semblances that are not additional virtues

Confidence, preparedness, aggression, and endurance are integral movements within fortitude's field, not automatically separate virtues. Confidence without realistic self-knowledge becomes presumption; endurance without a good end becomes hardness; attack without authority or proportion becomes violence. Magnanimity and magnificence extend the family's reach from resisting evil to undertaking difficult positive goods. Patience, longanimity, perseverance, and constancy distinguish why remaining faithful is hard: present sorrow, delayed attainment, prolonged toil, or external obstruction.

8 Temperance: Cardinal Virtue and Its Parts

Temperance preserves reason's order within attractions that are good in themselves but can absorb attention and desire. In the strict sense it moderates the strongest pleasures of touch; by extension its annexed virtues moderate anger, self-estimation, desire for knowledge, bodily presentation, and play. Aristotle treats temperance in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.10–12 and several lesser means in IV; Aquinas's full architecture occupies ST II–II, qq. 141–170.

8.1 The principal virtue and the pleasures of touch

8.1.1 Temperance

Class and provenance: Principal cardinal virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and III.10–12; Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25; ST II–II, qq. 141–145; CCC 1809.

Formal object: Pleasures and desires of touch, especially those attached to food, drink, and sex, measured by bodily good, personal vocation, justice, and reason.

Characteristic act: To desire and enjoy sensible goods in the manner, measure, circumstances, and end that sustain the whole human good.

Defect-side opposition: **Insensibility** rejects fitting bodily pleasure contrary to reason (M).

Excess-side opposition: **Self-indulgence** lets pleasure overrule reason (M).

Boundary: Temperance is not absence of appetite, fear of the body, aesthetic minimalism, or a naturally low intensity of desire. Integral “shamefacedness” and love of moral beauty dispose or ornament it but are not coordinate virtues.

Temperance does not ask whether pleasure is intense in the abstract; it asks whether desire answers a genuinely fitting good. A feast can be temperate and a small meal gluttonous when the former expresses communion and proportion while the latter is chosen through domination by appetite. Voluntary abstention can serve health, solidarity, worship, or freedom; it becomes disordered when it rejects a creature as evil, violates duty, or seriously harms the person without proportionate reason.

8.2 Integral parts: shamefacedness and moral beauty

Conditions of complete temperance

Aquinas identifies **shamefacedness** and **honesty** or love of moral beauty as integral parts of temperance (ST II–II, qq. 143–145). Shame is a passion that recoils from disgrace and is especially useful before virtue is settled; it is treated later as a qualified state, not counted as another strict virtue. Moral beauty names the fitting radiance of ordered action and belongs broadly to virtue rather than adding a separate habit.

8.3 Subjective species: food, drink, and sexual appetite

8.3.1 Abstinence

Class and provenance: Subjective species of temperance; ST II–II, qq. 146–148.

Formal object: Food and the pleasures of eating as ordered to health, shared life, discipline, and higher goods.

Characteristic act: To take or forego food according to right quantity, kind, time, manner, and end.

Defect-side opposition: Unreasonable refusal of nourishment is a real disorder but has no virtue-specific source name (U); it falls under insensibility or another failure according to its object.

Excess-side opposition: **Gluttony** is the named local contrary that subordinates reason to the pleasure or pursuit of food (K); it is not one member of a complete named pair.

Boundary: Fasting is an act that abstinence and religion can command, not another habit. Body size, appetite, illness, poverty, culinary pleasure, and eating frequency do not by themselves reveal virtue or vice.

8.3.2 Sobriety

Class and provenance: Subjective species of temperance; ST II–II, qq. 149–150.

Formal object: Intoxicating drink and its power to alter rational use. By extension the term may be applied analogically, but the controlling dossier is specific.

Characteristic act: To use or abstain from alcohol so that reason, responsibility, health, and charity retain their order.

Defect-side opposition: Culpable abstention that gravely harms bodily good would be vicious, but Aquinas expressly leaves it unnamed (U); abstinence from alcohol is not by itself a failure.

Excess-side opposition: **Drunkenness** is the named local contrary that voluntarily disorders or surrenders rational use through intoxication (K), with culpability depending on knowledge and freedom.

Boundary: Sobriety is not a diagnosis of addiction or a judgment based on one visible beverage. Medical vulnerability, scandal, law, office, and duty can make abstention the prudent act.

8.3.3 Chastity

Class and provenance: Subjective species of temperance; Augustine, *City of God* I.18, on chastity as a virtue of the soul governed by the will; ST II–II, qq. 151 and 153–154; CCC 2337.

Formal object: Sexual appetite and acts as integrated with the truth of the person, vocation, fidelity, generation, and charity.

Characteristic act: To govern sexual desire and conduct so that they express a just and integral personal good rather than using oneself or another.

Defect-side opposition: No virtue-specific defect-side vice is named (U); insensibility, fear, trauma, or lack of desire must not be relabeled as moral vice.

Excess-side opposition: **Lust** is the named local contrary that seeks sexual pleasure against reason and the goods specifying the act (K); no coordinate defect flank is supplied.

Boundary: Chastity is not simply non-activity, bodily intactness, repression, or one vocation. Married and unmarried chastity have different fitting acts under one virtue. “Purity” in ST II–II, q. 151, a. 4 is not a second coordinate virtue. The distinct use of *mollities* in q. 154, a. 11 belongs to Aquinas’s historical classification of acts; it is neither q. 138’s perseverance defect nor an identity label.

8.3.4 Virginity

Class and provenance: Special virtue within chastity, formally grounded in a deliberate and stable purpose; Augustine, *On Holy Virginity* 8, 18; ST I–II, q. 64, a. 1 ad 3; II–II, q. 152, aa. 1, 3.

Formal object: Perpetual renunciation of sexual intercourse for a fitting spiritual good, undertaken by a deliberate and stable purpose.

Characteristic act: To preserve that purpose and embody undivided dedication according to one’s state and duties.

Defect-side opposition: An unnamed circumstantial deficiency fails to keep an undertaken purpose when or as due (U); marriage and chaste marital intercourse are goods, not deficiencies of virtue.

Excess-side opposition: Undertaking or observing virginity for superstition, vainglory, or another undue end is a circumstantial excess without a dedicated vice proper to virginity (U).

Boundary: Bodily integrity can exist without the virtue and can be lost without voluntary fault; the virtue formally lies in the purpose. Virginity is a counsel and vocation, not the maximum possible “quantity” of chastity.

8.4 Potential parts: continence, anger, and lesser matters

Potential parts extend temperance's restraint to secondary matters. Continence resists disordered desire but lacks the completed harmony of strict moral virtue and is therefore treated among the qualified states. Clemency and meekness govern punishment and anger; modesty gathers lesser movements and contains more specifically named virtues where a distinct object warrants them (ST II–II, q. 143, a. 1; qq. 155–169).

8.4.1 Clemency

Class and provenance: Annexed virtue of temperance; ST II–II, qq. 157 and 159.

Formal object: A superior's impulse and authority to impose punishment upon a person subject to judgment.

Characteristic act: To mitigate penalty where reason permits while preserving correction, protection, and justice.

Defect-side opposition: **Laxity** is the compact attested description of undue remission: mitigating punishment against justice (U; ST II–II, q. 159, a. 2, obj. 3). Aquinas does not establish it as a dedicated vice species.

Excess-side opposition: **Cruelty** inclines one to exceed rational order in punishment (M).

Boundary: Clemency presupposes authority to punish and differs from meekness, which moderates one's anger, and mercy, which responds to misery. It cannot waive another person's claim without standing.

8.4.2 Meekness

Class and provenance: Annexed virtue of temperance and Aristotelian mean often rendered gentleness; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.5; ST II–II, q. 157.

Formal object: Anger: the passion that seeks resistance or redress under an apprehended injury.

Characteristic act: To become angry, remain calm, or act against injury according to the right cause, person, intensity, time, and manner.

Defect-side opposition: **Spiritlessness** fails to resist wrong when reason requires anger and action (M).

Excess-side opposition: **Irascibility** lets anger exceed reason in cause, object, intensity, duration, or expression (M).

Boundary: Meekness is not quiet temperament, conflict avoidance, inability to feel anger, or tolerance of abuse. Just anger remains an instrument rather than the ruler of action.

8.5 Modesty and its specified fields

In Aquinas, *modestia* is the common moderation of matters less difficult than temperance's principal pleasures. Some of its fields receive special virtues because their objects supply distinct rational measures: humility for the appetite of excellence, studiousness for knowledge, and eutrapelia for play. Bodily movement and dress remain applications of modesty rather than additional coordinate habits (ST II–II, qq. 160–169).

8.5.1 Modesty

Class and provenance: General annexed virtue of temperance in lesser movements; ST II–II, q. 160.

Formal object: The outward and inward movements not already governed by a more specifically named temperance-family virtue.

Characteristic act: To give gesture, bearing, presentation, and lesser impulses a form fitting person, place, role, culture, and end.

Defect-side opposition: No single dedicated defect vice covers modesty’s diverse matter (U); neglect of fitting expression must be specified by context.

Excess-side opposition: No single dedicated excess vice covers it (U); theatricality, display, and rigidity are different failures rather than one canonical extreme.

Boundary: Modesty is not reduced to sexual conduct or clothing, and culturally unfamiliar expression is not presumptively vice. Humility, studiousness, and eutrapelia receive separate dossiers because their formal objects differ.

8.5.2 Humility

Class and provenance: Specified virtue under modesty; Augustine, *City of God* XIV.13 and *On Holy Virginity* 31–32 (the latter mediated through Aquinas’s citations); ST II–II, q. 161, aa. 1–2.

Formal object: One’s appetite for excellence and standing, measured by truth about creaturely dependence, gifts, limits, vocation, and God.

Characteristic act: To restrain claims beyond one’s measure and to submit oneself rightly without denying gifts entrusted for service.

Defect-side opposition: No distinct defect-side vice is supplied (U). False self-lowering can be pride’s counterfeit expression rather than a separate flank.

Excess-side opposition: **Pride** is the named contrary that seeks excellence against right order, especially through refusal of due subjection to God (K).

Boundary: Humility and magnanimity are complementary: truth restrains false greatness and also forbids pusillanimous denial of real capacity. Humiliation suffered, low status, timidity, and self-dislike are not the virtue.

8.5.3 Studiousness

Class and provenance: Specified virtue under modesty; ST II–II, qq. 166–167.

Formal object: The desire and effort to know, ordered by the truth sought, one’s duties, method, authority, time, and the use of knowledge.

Characteristic act: To apply the mind earnestly and proportionately to knowledge worth seeking.

Defect-side opposition: **Neglect** of study is the defect-side failure when bodily aversion to effort keeps the mind from knowledge that should be sought (M; ST II–II, q. 166, a. 2).

Excess-side opposition: **Curiosity** is the excess-side disorder that pursues knowledge in a wrong object, motive, method, priority, or use (M).

Boundary: Studiousness differs from the intellectual virtues that perfect knowledge already possessed. Information volume, academic degree, novelty, and intrusive access are not measures of its excellence.

8.5.4 Eutrapelia (ready wit in play)

Class and provenance: Specified virtue under modesty and Aristotelian mean; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.8; ST II-II, q. 168, aa. 2–4.

Formal object: Rest, games, humor, and playful conversation as necessary recreation for a finite rational life.

Characteristic act: To give and receive fitting amusement in a way proportioned to persons, time, subject, and moral good.

Defect-side opposition: **Boorishness** rejects or spoils fitting play (M).

Excess-side opposition: **Buffoonery** sacrifices truth, dignity, duty, or another's good to amusement (M).

Boundary: Eutrapelia is not constant wit, entertainment skill, sarcasm, or exemption from reverence. Serious temperament can possess it through a fitting willingness to rest.

Bearing and dress

ST II-II, qq. 168–169 applies modesty to bodily movement, voice, display, and clothing. The measure includes truthful social meaning, decency, role, custom, resources, beauty, and the avoidance of vanity or culpable negligence. No garment, luxury level, style, or gesture is virtuous in abstraction. Because Aquinas returns these applications to modesty rather than establishing new habits, the census nests them here and does not create “decorum” and “dress moderation” rows.

8.6 Temperance as liberation

Pleasure, anger, recognition, knowledge, and play are human goods or powers for good; temperance does not compete with their created goodness. It frees them from becoming total claims. This is why temperance can appear both restrained and abundant: it says no to domination so that appetite can say a fuller yes to health, communion, truth, worship, beauty, and love.

9 Other Moral Virtues with Secure Provenance

The cardinal architecture is comprehensive at the level of principal subject and formal mode, but Aquinas's named parts-lists do not supply a non-editorial family placement for every moral virtue securely attested in the controlling corpus. This section therefore retains two strict moral virtues without disguising either one as theological or assigning it a Thomistic parent that the source does not establish.

Mercy is a distinct moral virtue treated by Aquinas among charity's effects; charity can command its act, but mercy is not a fourth theological virtue (ST II-II, q. 30, a. 3). The **unnamed mean concerning ordinary honor** is established in Aristotle's moral catalogue and received in Aquinas's elevenfold account, but it is not named as a potential part of fortitude in ST II-II, q. 128 (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.4; ST I-II, q. 60, a. 5).

Their separate placement does not put them outside the cardinal order in every sense: all moral virtues remain reducible to the four principal virtues by subject or formal principle (ST I-II, q. 61, a. 2, ad 3). Because these two entries share no single parts-list or source sequence, they are ordered alphabetically by their preferred English names: mercy, then the unnamed mean concerning ordinary honor.

9.1 Mercy (*misericordia*)

Class and provenance: Distinct moral virtue treated among charity's effects; ST II-II, q. 30, aa. 1-4; Augustine, *City of God* IX.5. Charity can command mercy's act, and mercy can fulfill justice, but neither relation changes its class.

Formal object: Another's misery considered as an evil to be removed, under the order of reason and the common good.

Characteristic act: To take another's misery as one's own in compassionate concern and to supply an effective remedy when possible.

Defect-side opposition: **Mercilessness** (Latin *immisericordia*) is a broad contrary description, and cruelty can sometimes be used in that extended sense, but the controlling sources supply no virtue-specific contrary noun or mean flank (U).

Excess-side opposition: **Unregulated pity** can impede counsel and wander from justice (X); indulgence that confirms harm is one counterfeit of mercy, not mercy perfected beyond measure.

Boundary: The passion of pity can dispose one to mercy but is not the virtue itself. Clemency moderates punishment by a superior; liberality gives external goods; beneficence is a broader act of charity.

Mercy is greatest among virtues concerning the neighbor because it supplies another's defect from one's abundance. Charity remains greatest simply because it joins the person to God. Divine mercy does not arise from affective suffering in God; it names God's effective removal of misery. Human mercy ordinarily includes affective resonance, but its moral excellence lies in reason-governed willing and assistance rather than the strength of emotion alone.

9.2 Unnamed mean concerning ordinary honor

Class and provenance: Aristotelian character virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.4; received in Aquinas's general catalogue at ST I-II, q. 60, a. 5. Aristotle leaves the mean unnamed; Aquinas uses *philotimia* for the virtue. This residual placement is editorial, not a Thomistic parts-list claim.

Formal object: Lesser and ordinary honors, responsibilities, and recognition proportioned to one's real capacity and to the good served.

Characteristic act: To seek, accept, or decline ordinary honor as reason and service require, without making recognition the final end.

Defect-side opposition: Aristotle's **aphilotimia** names the deficient disposition toward ordinary honor (M); "unambitiousness" is a serviceable English gloss, but the term can receive praise when honor ought to be declined.

Excess-side opposition: Aristotle's **philotimia** names the excessive disposition in this contrast (M); "ambition" or "love of honor" is a gloss, though the same word can receive praise when honor is rightly sought.

Boundary: The virtue is not magnanimity, which concerns great honor and a person capable of great deeds. Because Aristotle's two extreme terms are context-sensitive and his mean has no fixed name, the appendix preserves the source terms rather than inventing globally unique English vice names.

10 The Remaining Intellectual Virtues

Aristotle identifies five ways by which the soul possesses truth without error in affirmation or denial: art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intellect (*Nicomachean Ethics* VI.3). Prudence has already been treated because it is also cardinal and because it depends upon right appetite for its complete act. The other four perfect speculative reason or productive reason. Their measure is truth or the right work, not a quantitative mean of passion (ST I-II, q. 57).

10.1 Understanding of principles (*nous/intellectus*)

Class and provenance: Principal intellectual virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.6; ST I–II, q. 57, a. 2.

Formal object: Indemonstrable first principles that make demonstration and ordered inquiry possible.

Characteristic act: To apprehend a first principle as true and foundational rather than infer it from a prior demonstration.

Defect-side opposition: A **false denial** misses truth by deficiency at the level of judgment, but no dedicated passion-like vice habit flanks understanding (U).

Excess-side opposition: A **false affirmation** misses truth by excess at the level of judgment (U); multiplying axioms without warrant is faulty reasoning, not too much understanding.

Boundary: This acquired intellectual habit is distinct from the infused gift of understanding, from intelligence as measured aptitude, and from prudence's situational grasp.

10.2 Science (*episteme/scientia*)

Class and provenance: Principal intellectual virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.3; ST I–II, q. 57, a. 2.

Formal object: Necessary or stable conclusions known through their causes by demonstration within a discipline.

Characteristic act: To demonstrate and assent to conclusions as following from true principles by a valid explanatory order.

Defect-side opposition: A **false denial** misses demonstrated truth by deficiency, while culpable ignorance can be a separate privation where knowledge is due; neither supplies a dedicated mean-flank vice habit (U).

Excess-side opposition: A **false affirmation** misses truth by excess (U); scientism is a philosophical overreach about method, not superabundant *scientia*.

Boundary: The classical habit is not coextensive with modern natural science, accumulated information, credentials, or every probable conclusion. It can be morally misused because it perfects knowing rather than appetite.

10.3 Wisdom (*sophia/sapientia*)

Class and provenance: Highest principal speculative intellectual virtue by object; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.7; ST I–II, q. 57, a. 2; q. 66, a. 5.

Formal object: The highest causes, and lower truths judged and ordered in their light.

Characteristic act: To know the supreme causes available to the discipline and to judge the ordered whole through them.

Defect-side opposition: A **false denial** misses truth by deficiency at the level of judgment (U); folly belongs to a different moral-theological analysis rather than a quantitative flank of this intellectual habit.

Excess-side opposition: A **false affirmation** misses truth by excess (U); speculative pretension is counterfeit wisdom rather than wisdom beyond measure.

Boundary: Philosophical wisdom differs formally from the theological virtue of faith and from the Holy Spirit's gift of wisdom, though grace can order and elevate intellectual inquiry.

10.4 Art (*techne/ars*)

Class and provenance: Principal productive intellectual virtue; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.4; ST I–II, q. 57, aa. 3–4.

Formal object: A work capable of being made, considered according to the true plan and standards internal to its production.

Characteristic act: To conceive and execute the right form of a work through reliable productive reason.

Defect-side opposition: **Atechnia** (Greek *atechnia*, “lack of art”) is Aristotle’s named contrary: a productive state involving false reasoning about what can be made (K). It can miss the work’s rule by defect or excess, so its placement on the defect side is lexical rather than quantitative.

Excess-side opposition: Art has no dedicated excess-side mate (U). A false productive judgment can posit what the work’s plan does not warrant, but that act-level failure is not superabundant art; virtuosity used for an evil end can remain technically excellent while morally corrupted in its use.

Boundary: Art perfects the work as made; prudence perfects the maker’s action as human. Incompetence can be nonculpable and negligence belongs to a wider moral judgment. The fine arts are one subset of *ars*, which also includes crafts and disciplined productive skills.

11 Qualified and Cognate States

The following realities have sound Aristotelian, Augustinian, or Thomistic provenance and are indispensable to a comprehensive study, but their own sources qualify their status. They are therefore not silently promoted into the strict virtue census. Their dossiers preserve the same analytical fields so that the reason for qualification is visible.

11.1 Natural or inchoate virtue

Class and provenance: Natural aptitude, seed, or likeness of virtue, not perfected moral virtue in the strict sense; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.13, 1144b1–17; ST I–II, q. 63, a. 1.

Formal object: Natural principles of reason and appetite, together with temperamental capacities that can incline toward acts resembling virtue.

Characteristic act: To supply an aptitude or beginning that right reason, prudence, choice, and habituation must form into acquired virtue; grace can heal and elevate the person beyond that natural proportion.

Defect-side opposition: No defect-side vice applies merely from weaker aptitude (NA); temperament is not culpability.

Excess-side opposition: No excess-side vice applies merely from stronger aptitude (NA); an unguided native tendency can become harmful because it lacks prudence, not because perfected virtue is excessive.

Boundary: Natural courage, sympathy, quick judgment, or restraint is neither moral destiny nor a settled habit. This dossier makes explicit the qualified state already distinguished in the philosophical grammar.

11.2 Continence

Class and provenance: Praiseworthy state, broadly called a virtue but not perfect moral virtue in the strict Aristotelian sense; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.1–10; Augustine, *On Continence*; ST II–II, qq. 155–156.

Formal object: Disordered strong desire that conflicts with a sound rational choice.

Characteristic act: To stand by right judgment and refuse the wrongful act despite appetite that has not yet been harmonized.

Defect-side opposition: **Incontinence** is the received named contrary in which judgment yields to desire (K); because continence is qualified, it remains outside the strict table.

Excess-side opposition: No excess-side opposition applies (NA); insensibility is a different disorder, and virtuous harmony is better than continued interior conflict.

Boundary: The continent person acts rightly but desires discordantly; the temperate person also has appetite ordered. Continence is morally valuable and often necessary in formation, yet it is not the completed harmony of virtue.

11.3 Shame (*aidos/verecundia*)

Class and provenance: Praiseworthy passion and disposition, not a virtue strictly speaking; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 and IV.9; ST II–II, q. 144.

Formal object: Disgrace apprehended as an evil attached to a base action.

Characteristic act: To recoil affectively from disgrace in a manner that can deter wrongdoing or assist repentance.

Defect-side opposition: **Shamelessness** has deficient fear of deserved disgrace (M, qualified because the mean is a passion).

Excess-side opposition: **Bashfulness** fears disgrace excessively or where no base act warrants it (M, qualified).

Boundary: The mature virtuous person chiefly avoids base action because it is base, not merely from fear of exposure. Toxic humiliation and involuntary embarrassment are not moral virtue.

11.4 Complete friendship

Class and provenance: Aristotle calls friendship a virtue or something involving virtue; the complete kind is constituted by reciprocal love of the good, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.1, 3–4 and IX.4, 9; ST II–II, q. 23, a. 1; q. 114, a. 1. It is treated as a virtuous relation rather than one additional habit.

Formal object: The friend's good and a shared life in which each loves the other as another self for the other's character and good.

Characteristic act: To will and communicate good reciprocally, live together in fitting activity, and sustain truthful concord.

Defect-side opposition: No single defect-side vice exhausts failed friendship (NA); isolation, exploitation, betrayal, and indifference differ formally.

Excess-side opposition: No excess-side opposition applies (NA); possessiveness is a corruption of love and justice, not friendship perfected too far.

Boundary: Friendships of utility and pleasure are real but incomplete and fragile. Complete friendship differs from affability toward ordinary associates and from supernatural charity's friendship with God.

11.5 Righteous indignation (*nemesis*)

Class and provenance: Praiseworthy mean passion named by Aristotle, not a settled coordinate virtue in the developed census; *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7, 1108a30–b6; ST II–II, q. 36, aa. 1–2.

Formal object: The apparent distribution of good fortune in relation to desert.

Characteristic act: To feel proportionate pain at undeserved prosperity because one loves justice, without willing evil to the prosperous person.

Defect-side opposition: **Spite** is deficient in the relevant pain and can rejoice at another's misfortune (M, qualified).

Excess-side opposition: **Envy** is pained at another's good as such or beyond desert's relevance (M, qualified).

Boundary: The passion does not authorize private punishment or certainty about hidden desert. Christian joy in another's good and grief over injustice require charity, prudence, and epistemic humility.

11.6 Heroic or divine virtue

Class and provenance: Exceptional degree or mode set over against brutishness; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.1, 1145a15–33; ST I–II, q. 68, a. 1 ad 1; II–II, q. 159, a. 2 ad 1. It is not a further species parallel to courage or justice.

Formal object: The surpassing stability and excellence with which the whole rational life may embody moral good.

Characteristic act: To perform the acts of the virtues with a rare constancy and elevation that appears more than ordinary human excellence.

Defect-side opposition: **Bestiality** is Aristotle's named qualitative contrary (K), not a deficient quantity of ordinary virtue; ordinary genuine virtue is not vice.

Excess-side opposition: No excess-side opposition applies (NA); the heroic names excellence of mode, not a quantity that can overshoot reason.

Boundary: The Aristotelian category does not by itself establish canonized heroic virtue, infused grace, sanctity, miracles, or a juridical cause of saints. Those later theological and canonical judgments require their own sources.

11.7 Nobility-and-goodness (*kalokagathia*)

Class and provenance: Integrative Aristotelian capstone especially explicit in *Eudemian Ethics* VIII.3; retained as a qualified whole rather than a coordinate virtue.

Formal object: The noble exercise and ordering of the virtues and external goods under the complete human good.

Characteristic act: To choose noble acts for their own sake within an integrated excellent life.

Defect-side opposition: No separate defect-side vice applies (NA); vice and fragmentation name many failures rather than one paired extreme.

Excess-side opposition: No separate excess-side vice applies (NA); it is a title for integrated excellence.

Boundary: The term is not a license to import aristocratic birth, appearance, social class, or modern prestige into moral worth. It does not replace the distinct virtues whose integration it names.

11.8 Why qualification matters

A passion can be fitting without being a habit; a relation can involve virtue without being another power's perfection; a state can resist vice without giving appetite its final harmony; and an integrative title can name the whole without adding one part. Counting each as a coordinate virtue would make the catalogue larger but the philosophy poorer. Omitting them would conceal exactly the distinctions needed for formation.

12 Integration, Category Boundaries, and Formation

Virtue belongs within a larger moral and theological ecology. Powers act through habits; passions supply real perceptions and energies; prudence shapes a command; law teaches and measures; grace heals and elevates; gifts make the person readily responsive to the Holy Spirit; acts consolidate or weaken acquired dispositions; and communities make some actions easier to see and practice. A comprehensive study must distinguish these realities before explaining how they cooperate.

12.1 Virtue, vice, sin, and passion

A **sin** is a disordered act or omission; a **vice** is a stable bad habit disposing a power toward such acts. One grave act need not prove a settled vice, although it can establish grave guilt and begin or deepen a disposition. Conversely, a vicious inclination does not make every temptation a completed act. Moral evaluation distinguishes the chosen object, intention, circumstances, knowledge, freedom, effects, and duties involved.

A **passion** is a movement of sensitive appetite—love, desire, pleasure, hatred, aversion, sorrow, hope, despair, fear, daring, or anger in Aquinas’s common scheme (ST I–II, qq. 22–48). Passions are not morally evil simply by occurring. Their moral quality follows their object and their voluntary ordering. Moral virtue does not anesthetize them; it enables fear, anger, pleasure, and sorrow to perceive and serve the rational good more truthfully.

Defect and excess can therefore occur at several levels:

Level	Possible failure	Example	Why classification matters
Object	Choosing a kind of act incompatible with the good	Fraud presented as strategic prudence	No moderate quantity makes the object virtuous
Passion	Feeling too weakly, strongly, early, late, or toward the wrong object	Cowardly fear or rash daring	A genuine Aristotelian mean can apply
Judgment	Misidentifying the rule, facts, or fitting means	Credulity mistaken for faith	The failure is counterfeit or error, not excess virtue
Outcome / due	Giving one party less or more than equality requires	Unequal distribution	The deprived party does not thereby possess a vice

12.2 Gifts, fruits, beatitudes, and grace

The seven gifts of the Holy Spirit—wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear of the Lord—are distinct infused dispositions by which the person is made readily movable by the Spirit (ST I–II, q. 68; CCC 1830–1831). Repeated names do not mean identity. The intellectual virtue of wisdom judges through highest causes available to reason; the gift of wisdom gives connatural judgment under charity and divine motion. The moral virtue of fortitude follows reason; the gift makes a person responsive to divine prompting beyond reason’s ordinary mode. Piety as justice renders natural and civic debts; the gift gives filial readiness before God.

The **beatitudes** name perfected acts and the paths of evangelical happiness; the **fruits** name acts whose spiritual goodness has become delightful (ST I–II, qq. 69–70; CCC 1716–1729, 1832). Neither list is an alternate inventory of habits. Grace is not one virtue among others: sanctifying grace is a participated supernatural principle of life, and actual grace moves and assists acts. The theological and infused moral virtues are created habits caused by God within that graced order.

12.3 Other exclusions that prevent double counting

Reality	Proper classification	Reason it has no separate census row
Synderesis	Habitual grasp of first practical principles	Principle presupposed by prudence, not another moral virtue
Conscience	Act applying knowledge to a particular deed	It can judge well or badly and is not a stable virtue by that name
Martyrdom	Supreme act of fortitude under charity	An act can manifest several habits without becoming another habit
Fasting, almsgiving, prayer	Acts commanded by abstinence, liberality or mercy, and religion / charity	One act may be elicited by one virtue and commanded by another
Purity	In Aquinas, a circumstance or common designation within chastity	ST II-II, q. 151, a. 4 expressly declines a separate virtue
Bodily bearing and dress	Applications of modesty	Their measures vary, but Aquinas returns both to the parent habit
Memory, docility, foresight, caution	Integral conditions of complete prudence	Parts needed for one complete act are not coordinate species
Counsels and states of life	Chosen forms or stable conditions serving charity	Virginity has a formal virtuous purpose; religious life as such is not one more moral habit
Capital vices	Generative patterns of vice	They organize disordered ends and offspring, not a one-to-one reverse list of virtues
Temperament and aptitude	Natural or acquired traits	Ease, affective intensity, and skill require a right object and end to become morally virtuous

The exclusion ledger is not a demotion. Martyrdom can be a greater act than many routine acts of courage; the gifts elevate receptivity to divine motion; a beatitude can express the perfection toward which virtues tend. Classification answers *what kind of reality is this?*, not simply *how holy or important is it?*

12.4 Acquiring and exercising virtue

Acquired virtue grows through truthful perception, good models, deliberate acts, correction, and repeated choices in a community ordered by just practices. Repetition alone is insufficient: repeating an external action for vanity can consolidate vanity, while the same material action for a just end can educate appetite. Formation joins four movements:

1. **Name the objective good.** What person, truth, due, common good, or created pleasure specifies the act? Which goods are higher, and which duties are non-negotiable?
2. **Read the concrete field.** What facts, authority, relationships, vulnerabilities, likely effects, and uncertainties matter? Which passions disclose something real, and where may they distort attention?
3. **Deliberate and command.** Seek counsel proportioned to the gravity and reversibility of the choice; judge under sound principle; choose and execute a fitting means in due time.
4. **Review without self-deception.** Examine object, end, process, effect, and neglected voices. Make restitution or correction where due, give thanks for grace, and translate the lesson into the next act.

Small truthful acts ordinarily train powers for larger tests. Practicing measured speech prepares truthfulness under pressure; keeping ordinary commitments forms perseverance; receiving correction forms docility and humility; fitting

recreation protects attention for demanding work. Yet formation must also change unjust structures and occasions of sin. Asking individuals to endure preventable exploitation is not a substitute for justice.

In the infused order, prayer, Scripture, sacramental life, repentance, and works of charity dispose the person to receive and act under grace; they do not purchase infusion by repetition. A person should neither presume upon infusion while refusing ordinary formation nor reduce supernatural life to a self-improvement program.

12.5 A disciplined examination of action

The defect–virtue–excess table is best used as a set of questions, not a personality test:

- Did I identify the right formal object, or substitute comfort, reputation, control, novelty, or efficiency?
- Where a rational mean applies, was the response fitting in object, person, time, motive, manner, and intensity?
- Is the apparent “excess” actually a counterfeit—rashness posing as courage, flattery as affability, presumption as hope, or curiosity as study?
- In justice, who held the duty, who received less or more, what authority existed, and what restitution or protection remains due?
- Did counsel reach judgment and command, or did haste, endless inquiry, fear, and inconstancy interrupt the practical act?
- What would charity change about the end, prudence about the means, justice about another’s claim, fortitude about difficulty, and temperance about desire?

The proper conclusion may be a concrete act, a request for counsel, restitution, a boundary, prayer, patient delay, or an admission that the facts are insufficient. The method should increase responsibility and teachability, not confidence in diagnosing another person’s hidden habits.

12.6 The unity of a virtuous life

The four cardinal families map irreducible works of agency: discerning, rendering, standing firm, and moderating. The intellectual virtues secure truth in principles, conclusions, highest causes, making, and action. The theological virtues supply an end and communion beyond acquired human proportion. Augustine’s order of love and Aquinas’s form of charity show why the catalogue is ultimately architectural rather than additive: a person does not flourish by collecting isolated traits, but by having knowing, choosing, feeling, making, and relationship ordered together toward the true good and, by grace, God.

A Scope, Corpus, and Taxonomy

A.1 What this reference means by “comprehensive”

No dictionary or inherited chart supplies a self-authenticating list of every virtue. This work is comprehensive relative to a declared corpus: Aristotle’s securely attributed ethical works, principally the *Nicomachean Ethics*; Augustine’s identified treatments in *On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, *On Free Choice of the Will*, *On Christian Doctrine*, *On True Religion*, the *Enchiridion*, selected books of *City of God*, *On Continence*, *On Patience*, and *On Holy Virginity*; and Aquinas’s general treatise on habits and virtues, his virtue-ordered *Secunda secundae*, and the exceptional treatment of penance as a virtue in ST III, q. 85, with q. 90 controlling its sacramental boundary. The references and research scope give the exact internal loci. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* provides the present Catholic synopsis (CCC 1803–1845).

The controlling research inventory accounts for every candidate in those taxonomic loci. A principal virtue, a species, and an annexed or potential virtue can receive separate entries because their formal acts differ. An integral condition, an act of virtue, a passion, a gift, a fruit, a beatitude, a counsel, or a state of life does not become another coordinate

virtue merely because it is good. Synonyms and translations do not multiply realities. This rule prevents both a thin “seven virtues” chart and an unlimited list of every favorable trait.

A.2 Taxonomic levels and the rule against flattening

The fifty-two strict entries in this edition are *treated taxonomic entries*, not fifty-two mutually coordinate habits. The number includes principal virtues, generic family roots retained for definition, subjective species, potential parts, and a few nested special virtues. It says how many dossiers and strict appendix rows the declared corpus requires; it does not say that justice, particular justice’s species, and every annex stand beside one another at the same level. Parent and status are therefore visible in the appendix, while integral conditions and qualified non-virtues remain separately identified.

The dedicated cardinal overview defines integral, subjective, and potential parts before any cardinal family is unfolded. That distinction governs every later use of *part*, *species*, *annex*, *specified virtue*, and *nested virtue*. Where a source gives a more exact relation—equity’s relation to legal justice, longanimity’s cross-relation to magnanimity and patience, or constancy’s subordination to perseverance—the more exact account controls.

A.3 Controlling Thomistic distinctions

Three distinctions prevent the census from being flattened. ST I–II, q. 61, aa. 1–5 distinguishes the four determinate cardinal habits from general conditions and modal grades; ST II–II, q. 48, a. 1 distinguishes integral, subjective, and potential parts; and ST I–II, q. 64, aa. 1–4 distinguishes the rational mean of moral virtue, justice’s objective equality, intellectual conformity to truth, and theological virtue’s lack of intrinsic excess toward God.

More local controls remain nested in their source relations: imprudence and its act-level failures (II–II, q. 53); Aquinas’s reductions of reported justice lists (q. 80); obedience, gratitude, vindication, and equity (qq. 104–108, 120); magnanimity’s opposed failures and fortitude’s annexes (qq. 131–137); the distinct temperance species and penal relations (qq. 143–170); and penance as one special virtue rather than a multiplication of sacramental parts (III, qq. 85, 90). The dossier citations and source audit preserve the exact article-level decisions and translation choices.

A.4 The sorting algorithm

The order is reproducible:

1. **Theological virtues:** faith, hope, charity, in their order of generation; charity is separately first in perfection.
2. **The cardinal order:** an explicit overview names prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance and explains why there are four. Their families then follow in that received sequence: practical reason; will and dealings with another; firmness before grave difficulty; and moderation of attraction and pleasure.
3. **Within each cardinal family:** the principal virtue, integral conditions nested beneath it, subjective species, and potential or annexed virtues. Aquinas’s classification controls before his question order. Equity therefore follows legal justice; particular justice visibly parents distributive and commutative justice; penance follows commutative justice; personal prudence appears in the prudential species map; and sobriety stands beside abstinence as a coordinate species of temperance.
4. **Other strict moral virtues:** mercy and the unnamed mean concerning ordinary honor. Neither has a non-editorial placement in the four Thomistic parts-lists used here. They share no single source sequence and therefore follow the cardinal families in alphabetical order by preferred English title.
5. **Remaining intellectual virtues:** the speculative habits proceed from first principles (understanding), through demonstrated conclusions (science), to judgment by highest causes (wisdom); productive art follows them because its terminus is a work made. Prudence has already appeared as both intellectual and cardinal and is not duplicated.
6. **Qualified states and exclusions:** the treated states proceed pedagogically from natural beginning and incomplete self-command, through affective safeguard, virtuous relation, and mean-like passion, to extraordinary mode and integrative whole: natural or inchoate virtue, continence, shame, friendship, righteous indignation, heroic virtue,

and *kalokagathia*. Gifts, fruits, beatitudes, acts, and other exclusions then remain in the ledger so that resemblance does not erase classification.

This is an *order of exposition*, not one descending scale. Faith precedes hope and charity in generation; charity is greatest in perfection (1 Cor. 13:13; ST I-II, q. 62, a. 4; q. 66, a. 6). Understanding precedes science as a principle of demonstration, while wisdom is the highest intellectual virtue by its object (ST I-II, q. 66, a. 5). Prudence leads the moral virtues as their rational guide, but justice can be nobler in its outward object (ST I-II, q. 66, a. 4).

A.5 How to read defect, excess, contrary, and counterfeit

The terminal table preserves the requested order **defect-side opposition—virtue—excess-side opposition**, but those columns do not always contain two quantitative vices. Each entry states its relation in words, and the following compact markers also appear in the dossiers:

M: mean flank

A source identifies deficient and excessive responses in a moral matter governed by right reason. Cowardice and rashness flank fortitude in this sense.

K: named contrary

A source supplies a real contrary without making it one half of a quantitative pair. Imprudence opposes prudence; unbelief opposes faith.

O: objective outcome

Justice's equality lies between loss and gain or disproportionate shortfall and surplus. These are outcomes in the parties, not two vices possessed by them.

X: counterfeit or corruption

A failure resembles the virtue while changing its object or rule. Craftiness resembles prudence and indulgence resembles mercy, but neither is "too much" virtue.

U: unnamed or unpaired

Either the source recognizes a departure but leaves it without a proper noun, or the virtue has no dedicated opposite proper to that side. The terminal table spells out which conclusion applies rather than printing an unexplained dash.

NA: inapplicable

The proposed axis does not govern that side. There is no excess of charity toward God, for example, though a counterfeit can resemble such an excess.

Primary-source accuracy governs the labels. A historically exact term such as *imprudence*, *disobedience*, *ingratitude*, or *irreligion* is not suppressed merely because its English form is privative. The prohibition is against analytic fillers such as "too little prudence" or "too much obedience," not against a source's own contrary noun. The same vice word may recur where the sources place it in different formal relations. Translation choices and editorial glosses remain marked; source-unnamed states remain unnamed, and absence of a dedicated opposite remains distinct from true inapplicability.

A.6 Three voices, one controlled synthesis

Aristotle analyzes acquired excellence within rational human flourishing: habituation, voluntary choice, rightly ordered passion, practical wisdom, friendship, and contemplation. Augustine reorders the entire life under the supreme good: the four cardinal virtues become distinct operations of rightly ordered love cleaving to God (*On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25). Aquinas receives the philosophical grammar while distinguishing powers, habits, acquired and infused causes, natural and supernatural ends, theological and moral virtues, gifts, and grace (ST I-II, qq. 49–70).

These are not flattened into a fictitious three-author consensus. Aristotle does not teach infused theological virtue. Augustine's "perfect love of God" is not a lexical replacement for every distinct habit. Aquinas does not make a named Aristotelian mean into dogma merely by using it. The synthesis identifies continuity, development, and formal difference at the point where each matters.

A.7 Limits on use

A virtue dossier describes an objective habit and act, not the whole moral state of a person. One action can disclose something about choice without proving a settled habit; an externally similar act can proceed from fear, vanity, grace, coercion, prudence, or vice. Culpability also depends upon knowledge, freedom, object, intention, and circumstances. The reader may use the study for examination and formation, but not as a scorecard for ranking neighbors, cultures, sexes, vocations, illnesses, or personalities.

A.8 Citation, rights, and verification limits

This work is a source-grounded synthesis rather than a translation. Definitions and taxonomic judgments were checked against the cited loci; words in quotation marks are kept brief, while dossier definitions are original paraphrases. Bekker numbers control Aristotle citations; book, chapter, and section control Augustine; part, question, and article control Aquinas; paragraph numbers control the *Catechism*. The research records identify where an online transcription served as access witness and where a term remains editorial.

Scriptural references identify the canonical locus without reproducing a proprietary modern translation. Aristotle and Augustine's original texts are public domain. The Ross, Solomon, Edghill, NPNF, and 1920 Dominican translations used as access witnesses are public-domain editions in the United States; their host sites' editorial wrappers remain independent. The Holy See's official text and all third-party translations retain their own rights and are cited only by focused reference or very short phrase. Project-created definitions, classifications, tables, and editorial labels fall under the repository's stated license only to the extent the project holds the rights.

This work was source-audited against the cited loci but has not received independent philosophical, patristic, or theological review. It does not adjudicate disputed critical-text readings, provide a full history of later virtue terminology, replace a moral theology of individual acts and sins, or constitute magisterial or pastoral judgment.

B Taxonomic Defect–Virtue–Excess Lexicon

This appendix contains every strict virtue entry in the controlling census, but it does not pretend that all entries are coordinate or that every opposition is an Aristotelian mean. Its vice columns are deliberately lexical: they print the shortest source-faithful headword that still carries the idea. A qualifier remains when removing it would change the formal object, and a semicolon remains when one word would suppress distinct source-named disorders. Taxonomic and relational precision moves to the outer columns rather than being repeated inside the headword cells.

Three residuals, not three blanks

The table uses no unexplained dash. **Unnamed** means that the source recognizes the departure but leaves it without a proper noun. **Unpaired** means that this virtue has no dedicated opposite on that side, although an inherited failure, descriptive warning, or counterfeit may exist. **Inapplicable** means that the axis itself does not govern that side. A counterfeit resembles the virtue while changing its object or rule; an outcome in justice belongs to equality between parties and is not thereby a vice in the party who suffers it.

Source accuracy controls lexical neatness. Consequently, exact historical terms such as *imprudence*, *disobedience*, *ingratitude*, and *irreligion* appear even though their English forms are privative, and a word may recur under different formal relations. The rule against “too little virtue” and “too much virtue” remains: the table neither invents a mate for a one-sided contrary nor converts a counterfeit into an excess.

Level / parent	Defect-side term	Virtue	Excess-side term	Relation
Theological virtues				
Principal	Unbelief	Faith	Credulity ^E	Named contrary; counterfeit shown, but intrinsic excess is inapplicable
Principal	Despair	Hope	Salvific presumption ^E	Opposed vices; the divine object admits no excess
Principal	Hatred of God	Charity	Inapplicable	Named contrary; no intrinsic excess in divine love
Cardinal virtues—prudence and its parts				
Principal; personal species	Imprudence	Prudence	Craftiness	Named contrary; counterfeit, not excess
Subjective species	Imprudence	Regnative prudence	Tyranny ^E	Inherited contrary; counterfeit
Subjective species	Imprudence	Political prudence	Factionalism ^E	Inherited contrary; counterfeit
Subjective species	Imprudence	Domestic or economic prudence	Domination ^E	Inherited contrary; counterfeit
Subjective species	Imprudence	Military prudence	Aggression ^E	Inherited contrary; counterfeit
Potential part: counsel	Precipitation	Euboulia	Unpaired	Act-level contrary; no dedicated mate
Potential part: ordinary judgment	Thoughtlessness	Synesis	Unpaired	Act-level contrary; no dedicated mate
Potential part: higher judgment	Thoughtlessness	Gnome	Arbitrariness ^E	Shared contrary; counterfeit

Continued on next page

Level / parent	Defect-side term	Virtue	Excess-side term	Relation
Cardinal virtues—justice and its parts				
Principal	Injustice; loss	Justice	Gain	Named contrary; objective outcomes are not party-vices
General aspect	Lawlessness	Legal or general justice	Tyranny ^E	Named contrary; counterfeit
Subjective part: legal	Rigid literalism ^E	Equity	Arbitrariness ^E	Editorial warning; counterfeit; no dedicated pair
Part: legal justice	Undue remission	Severity	Cruelty	Undedicated deficiency; corruption; clemency remains compatible
Species: particular justice	Shortfall	Distributive justice	Surplus	Objective proportional outcomes
Species: particular justice	Loss	Commutative justice	Gain	Objective arithmetic outcomes
Special infused; under commutative	Impenitence	Penance as virtue	Inapplicable	Named contrary; maximal fitting return is not vice
Potential part	Irreligion	Religion	Superstition	Named circumstantial mean flanks
Potential part	Dereliction ^E	Piety	Favoritism ^E	Descriptive warning; counterfeit; no dedicated pair
Potential part	Contempt	Observance	Adulation ^E	Nearby failure; counterfeit; no dedicated pair
Species: observance	Disdain ^E	Dulia	Creature-worship ^E	Descriptive warning; corruption; no quantitative pair
Special annex: observance	Disobedience	Obedience	Indiscreet obedience	Named contrary; source phrase for circumstantial excess
Potential part	Ingratitude	Gratitude	Unnamed	Named defect; source-recognized excess unnamed
Potential part	Remissness	Vindication	Brutality	Named mean flanks; cruelty is the source alternative
Potential part; Aristotelian mean	<i>Eironeia</i> ^T	Truthfulness	Boastfulness	Named mean flanks; defect is false self-deprecation
Potential part; Aristotelian mean	Quarrelsomeness	Affability	Obsequiousness; flattery	Named mean flanks; flattery is gain-seeking
Potential part; Aristotelian mean	Avarice	Liberality	Prodigality	Named mean flanks in wealth
Cardinal virtues—fortitude and its parts				
Principal	Cowardice	Fortitude	Rashness	Named mean flanks in fear and daring
Potential part	Pusillanimity	Magnanimity	Presumption concerning capacity ^E ; ambition; vainglory	Named excesses by capacity, honor, and glory
Potential part	Paltriness ^T	Magnificence	Waste ^T	Named mean flanks; Greek excess adds vulgar or tasteless display

Continued on next page

Level / parent	Defect-side term	Virtue	Excess-side term	Relation
Potential part	Impatience	Patience	Inapplicable	Named contrary; no intrinsic excess
Cross-related: patience	Impatience at delay	Longanimity	Inapplicable	Inherited contrary; no intrinsic excess
Potential part	Softness	Perseverance	Pertinacity	Named mean flanks in persistence
Specification: perseverance	Unpaired	Constancy	Obstinacy^E	No dedicated defect; counterfeit excess
Cardinal virtues—temperance and its parts				
Principal	Insensibility	Temperance	Self-indulgence	Named mean flanks in pleasures of touch
Subjective species: food	Unnamed	Abstinence	Gluttony	Unnamed refusal; named local contrary
Subjective species: drink	Unnamed	Sobriety	Drunkenness	Expressly unnamed abstention; named local contrary
Subjective species: sexual appetite	Unpaired	Chastity	Lust	No dedicated defect; named local contrary
Special virtue: chastity	Unnamed	Virginity	Superstition; vainglory	Circumstantial failures; marriage is not defect
Potential part	Laxity^T	Clemency	Cruelty	Descriptive deficiency; cruelty is direct contrary
Potential part; Aristotelian mean	Spiritlessness^T	Meekness	Irascibility	Named mean flanks in anger
Generic potential part	Unpaired	Modesty	Unpaired	Heterogeneous matter; no single pair
Specified under modesty	Unpaired	Humility	Pride	No dedicated defect; named contrary
Specified under modesty	Neglect	Studiosness	Curiosity	Named mean flanks in study
Specified under modesty; Aristotelian mean	Boorishness	Eutrapelia	Buffoonery	Named mean flanks in play
Other strict moral virtues with secure provenance				
Strict moral; charity effect	Mercilessness^T	Mercy	Unregulated pity; indulgence	Broad contrary; affective corruption and counterfeit
Strict Aristotelian mean	<i>Aphilotimia</i>^T	Unnamed mean concerning ordinary honor	<i>Philotimia</i>^T	Named flanks; Aristotle leaves the mean unnamed
Remaining intellectual virtues				
Speculative: first principles	False denial	Understanding of principles	False affirmation	Truth-failing acts, not vice habits
Speculative: conclusions	False denial	Science	False affirmation	Truth-failing acts, not vice habits

Continued on next page

Level / parent	Defect-side term	Virtue	Excess-side term	Relation
Speculative: highest causes	False denial	Wisdom	False affirmation	Truth-failing acts; folly belongs to another analysis
Productive	<i>Atechnia</i> ^T	Art	Unpaired	“Lack of art,” named contrary; no excess-side mate

^E **Editorial control.** The headword’s application to its row, or its qualifier, is a concise project control rather than a source-fixed technical opposition.
^T **Translation or transliteration control.** The terminology audit records the source word and major alternatives. Column position never turns a counterfeit, outcome, or act into a quantitative vice flank.

B.1 Qualified and cognate states outside the strict census

These seven concepts are necessary to the study but do not add seven coordinate virtue habits. Their classifications explain why they remain outside the fifty-two strict entries.

Classification	Defect-side comparison	Qualified state	Excess-side comparison	Reason it is not a strict entry
Natural aptitude or likeness	Inapplicable	Natural or inchoate virtue	Inapplicable	Beginning or aptitude requiring prudence and formation, not perfected habit
Imperfect moral state	Incontinence	Continence	Inapplicable	Right choice resists appetite that remains discordant
Mean-like passion	Shamelessness	Shame	Bashfulness	Passion or safeguard, especially in the imperfect, rather than settled virtue
Reciprocal excellent relation	Inapplicable	Complete friendship	Inapplicable	Relation and shared activity involving virtue, not one further coordinate habit
Qualified Aristotelian mean-like passion	Spite ^T	Righteous indignation	Envy ^T	Pain is measured by fortune in relation to desert; classification remains qualified
Exceptional mode or degree	Bestiality	Heroic or divine virtue	Inapplicable	Qualitative contrary; excellence above ordinary virtue, not a parallel species
Integrative capstone	Inapplicable	Nobility-and-goodness ^T (<i>kalokagathia</i>)	Inapplicable	Whole or integrated state rather than one constituent habit

B.2 Count, hierarchy, and sorting check

The strict table has fifty-two entries: three theological; forty-three within the four cardinal families (eight prudence, seventeen justice, seven fortitude, eleven temperance); two other securely attested moral virtues; and four remaining intellectual virtues. “Fifty-two” is therefore an entry and dossier count, not a metaphysical claim that all rows are coordinate. The separate qualified table displays seven additional concepts without adding them to that count.

The visible order is type, received cardinal sequence, then source-defined level. Audit keys remain in the inventory; parent and level serve readers here. Conditions, acts, gifts, fruits, beatitudes, counsels, states, aliases, and reduced lists remain in the exclusion ledger.

C References

C.1 Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics.

Greek loci and the public-domain W. D. Ross translation (1925), consulted through the Perseus Greek and English editions, the Wikisource transcription, and the Internet Classics Archive. Governing loci: II.1–9 (habit, definition, mean, map, shame and indignation); III.6–12 (courage and temperance); IV.1–9 (liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, ordinary honor, gentleness, affability, truthfulness, eutrapelia, shame); V.1–10 (general, distributive, commutative justice, equity); VI.3–13 (five intellectual virtues, euboulia, synesis, gnome, connection, and natural virtue’s incompleteness without prudence at 1144b1–17); VII.7 (softness and ordinary endurance) and VII.9 (right-reason limits on persistence), together with VII.1–10 more broadly (heroic virtue, continence, incontinence); VIII–IX (friendship).

Eudemian Ethics.

III.7, 1234a24–34, for the uncertain status of shame and righteous indignation, and VIII.3, 1248b8–1249a17, for *kalokagathia* as an integrative capstone, using Joseph Solomon’s public-domain translation in W. D. Ross’s 1925 edition, consulted through the Wikisource transcription. Both uses are qualified rather than allowed to enlarge the strict virtue count.

Categories.

Chapter 8 for durable habit and less stable disposition, using E. M. Edghill’s public-domain translation through the Internet Classics Archive.

The Ross and Solomon renderings guide English terminology but do not settle every Greek ambiguity. In *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.4 Aristotle leaves the ordinary-honor mean unnamed and observes that ambition or love of honor and unambitiousness can each attract praise or blame according to how the desire is measured. For the appendix’s Aristotelian flank display, *aphilotimia* and *philotimia* mark deficient and excessive desire in that context. Aquinas, by contrast, calls the virtue itself *philotimia* in ST I–II, q. 60, a. 5. The publication states this cross-author difference rather than fabricating one ancient technical name common to both. In VI.4, Aristotle’s *atechnia*, rendered by Ross as “lack of art,” supplies art’s named contrary; because it is a false productive state rather than a quantitative deficiency, the excess side remains unpaired.

C.2 Augustine

The following nine works and their stated loci are the exact bounded Augustinian corpus for this edition; no additional direct Augustinian witness is implied. Most are public-domain English translations from the nineteenth-century *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* through New Advent’s transcriptions; the two entries marked as Latin checks use the identified Augustinus.it witness:

- *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* I.15.25, for the four cardinal virtues as ordered forms of the love of God;
- *On Free Choice of the Will* II.18.47–50 and II.19.51–53, checked in Latin, for virtue as the right use of goods that can otherwise be misused;
- *On Christian Doctrine* I.22–27 and 35–40, for the object and order of charity, the end of Scripture, and the governing relation of faith, hope, and charity;
- *On True Religion* 55.108–113, checked in Latin, for the worship owed to God alone as contextual support for religion’s object;
- *Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love* 3–8, 114, and 117–121, for the theological triad, pilgrim hope, charity’s primacy, and the end of the commandments;
- *City of God* I.18, for chastity as a virtue of the soul governed by the will; V.12–20, for the limits of civic glory; IX.5, for compassionate affection governed by reason; XIV.13, for pride and creaturely order; XV.22, for virtue as the order of love; and XIX.4, for the incompleteness of earthly virtue and happiness;

- *On Continence*, especially 1–3 and 26–27, for resistance to disordered desire under grace and the boundary from false continence;
- *On Patience* 1 and 8 (within 1–8 and 14–20 consulted), for endurance specified by a good end; and
- *On Holy Virginity* 8 and 18, for virginity’s dedicated purpose and marriage’s goodness. Its anti-pride use at 31–32 was identified through Aquinas’s citations and is marked mediated in the research records.

Augustine does not offer a single scholastic census corresponding to Aquinas’s question sequence. His contribution is therefore used where direct: theological orientation, ordered love, Christian patience, continence, virginity, humility, and the fourfold interpretation of cardinal virtue. Later classifications are not retroactively placed in Augustine’s mouth.

C.3 Thomas Aquinas

The controlling Latin work is the *Summa theologiae*. English was checked through the Fathers of the English Dominican Province translation (1920), consulted in New Advent’s Prima secundae index and Secunda secundae index. Principal loci are ST I–II, qq. 22–70 and 109–114; ST II–II, qq. 1–170, especially q. 138, aa. 1–2 and the distinct homonym at q. 154, a. 11; and ST III, qq. 85 and 90. Aquinas’s *Super I ad Corinthios* 6, lectio 2 supplies a separate medieval reading of 1 Corinthians 6:9–11. Exact dossier-level loci and the classification controls governing their use are recorded in the terminal apparatus and source audit.

C.4 Scripture and present Catholic synopsis

Principal scriptural texts are Wisdom 8:7; Matthew 5:1–12; Romans 5:1–5; 1 Corinthians 6:9–11 and 13; Galatians 5:6 and 5:22–23; Hebrews 11:1; and 2 Peter 1:5–7. The bounded reception control also uses two contrasting passages in Wasserschleben’s 1851 edition of Western penitentials; they are historical witnesses, not one universal code.

The present Catholic synopsis was checked in the Holy See’s English text of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1803–1845: human virtues (1804), prudence (1806), justice (1807), fortitude (1808), temperance (1809), formation and grace (1810–1811), theological virtues (1812–1829), gifts and fruits (1830–1832), and the summary (1833–1845). Supplemental official checks cover the beatitudes, 1716–1729, and the definition of chastity, 2337. The *Catechism* confirms the received Catholic frame; it does not supply every historical species or Aristotelian name in the expanded census.

Last revised (UTC): 2026-09-24T14:59:29Z

Reuse and rights. To the extent Triptych holds the rights, project-created content and design are licensed under CC BY 4.0. Scripture, liturgical or official texts, received prayers or hymns, quotations, fonts, and other third-party material retain their own status; public-domain material remains public domain. Identify changes. Attribution implies neither Triptych nor ecclesiastical approval. See LICENSE and THIRD_PARTY.md in the source.